The Illusion Of Diplomacy

Only incorrigible optimists could have expected any groundbreaking decisions to come out of the talks between Vadeful and Lavrov.

In late September 2026, a meeting took place between the foreign ministers of Germany and Russia—the first since the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. The conversation, which took place on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, lasted less than 20 minutes. The expressions on the faces of Johanna Wadephul and Sergey Lavrov—both at the moment of their handshake and after leaving the meeting room—speak louder than any commentary about the outcome of the meeting.

Not only did the meeting fail to bring about any progress in relations between the two countries or in the discussion of the central issue in European politics—ways to end the war against Ukraine—but it also, in essence, lacked any dialogue whatsoever.

So why did the heads of the two countries’ foreign ministries meet, and what did the parties achieve?

“Seasonal Escalation”

Since 2022, Germany has remained one of Ukraine’s most steadfast allies. Following the snap parliamentary elections and the rise to power of Friedrich Merz, support for Kyiv has only increased. Germany not only provides virtually any type of domestically produced weaponry suitable for this theater of operations—with the exception of Taurus missiles—but also participates in nearly every possible financial aid project for Ukraine. However, politicians and the public are by no means united in their desire to continue supporting Kyiv, especially when it comes to arms deliveries. Social, political, historical, and cultural traditions in Germany, as well as the country’s economic and political crisis, are having a significant impact.

Pressure on the federal government has not ceased throughout the four and a half years of full-scale war, but it has noticeably intensified during certain periods. Right now, the German political landscape is witnessing such a seasonal intensification: a heightened demand for a “diplomatic resolution to the conflict.”

Mertz is receiving signals from both the opposition and within the coalition.

“Alternative for Germany” (AfD), which won the elections in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, is demanding through its parliamentary group in the Bundestag that all arms deliveries to Ukraine be halted and that a “compromise peace” be achieved. AfD representatives advocate purchasing Russian energy resources and are even taking the first steps toward resuming cooperation, despite lacking the authority to do so.

The Left, which won the state elections in Berlin, is not as categorical at the federal level regarding support for Ukraine, but it also persistently reiterates the argument that weapons only prolong the war, and that a diplomatic solution is the only way to end it. At the party convention, the rallying cry was: “We don’t want to pay for your wars!” There is no need to even mention the consistently anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian stance of the Union Sary Wagenknecht (SSV).

Similar voices have recently been growing louder among conservatives in the CDU and social democrats in the SPD. The heads of Thuringia, Saxony, and Brandenburg called for “more active diplomacy” in a joint statement. Tobias Winkler (CDU), head of the German delegation to the OSCE, stated that “OSCE diplomacy” toward Russia “is by no means dead.” The leadership of the influential SPD branch in Baden-Württemberg called for exploring “new approaches in policy toward Ukraine” — the current course “should not be presented as the only option,” and “efforts toward a peaceful solution” must be intensified.

By agreement

For the already politically weakened chancellor, his foreign minister’s non-binding conversation with the Russian side was clearly seen as a positive domestic political signal: your criticisms are in vain; we are also making use of opportunities for dialogue. Wadeful did not fly to Moscow for this purpose, but instead spoke with Lavrov at the UN General Assembly, on neutral ground, where both were already present. The conversation had no formal status.

Mertz should not have expected any political surprises from Wadeful. Of course, the head of diplomacy is bound by his government’s decisions. But Wadeful’s predecessors as German foreign minister, Heiko Maas and Annalena Baerbock, were, prior to joining the Foreign Ministry, seasoned politicians with extensive experience and were able, at the very least, to “set their own priorities.” Moreover, their party affiliations differed from that of the head of the cabinet. From the current minister—a fellow party member, long-time close ally, and confidant of the incumbent chancellor—one could not expect any “independent initiative.”

Wadeful’s remarks about “a request from numerous colleagues in similar positions to hold this meeting” are evidence that Berlin, if it did not coordinate the meeting within the EU, certainly informed its partners of such plans. There is an informal understanding within the European Union: contacts with Russia must be based on a European consensus. Initiatives by individual states—and certainly by Germany—would, for obvious reasons, not be well received in Central Europe.

Indeed, the fact of the meeting was not criticized by the foreign ministries of countries east of the Oder. At most, a hint of surprise flashed through the Polish media, but that was not an official reaction from Warsaw. Kyiv also made no high-profile statements, and the Ukrainian press noted that the principle of “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine itself” had not been violated. Kyiv was also “informed of the details of the meeting.”

“Like peas against a wall”

Only incorrigible optimists could have expected any breakthrough decisions from the conversation between Wadeful and Lavrov. This is precluded not only by the current geopolitical situation but also by the level of the interlocutors. If Putin had wished to change his position in the war against Ukraine, he certainly wouldn’t have discussed it with Lavrov, and certainly not at a meeting with an “unfriendly” foreign minister.

Berlin would have acted differently as well: if the German chancellor’s office had come up with a serious proposal for Moscow, Merz would not have relied on Wadeful’s services, but, after discussing the proposal with European and American allies, as well as with Kyiv, would have made it the subject of negotiations between Ukraine, Russia, the EU, and the U.S., with the participation of neutral negotiators recognized by all parties.

The debates over the candidates this past May serve as the best evidence of this. But the outcome of the talks in New York was such that it tended to confirm the views of the most die-hard pessimists. More precisely, the meeting between the two ministers yielded absolutely no results.

According to German media reports, the provocations began right from the doorstep. English-language copies of a pamphlet titled “Goebbels’ Legacy: The Fabrication of Events in Bucha and the Kyiv Regime’s Bloody Staged Drama” were waiting on the tables for the German delegation. There is no need to explain why the name of a Nazi criminal appeared in the title of a document prepared for a meeting with the Germans. Eyewitnesses claim that Wadepful did not even touch the handout and covered it with his folder. The first few minutes set the tone for the meeting, the course of which can be readily reconstructed from articles and interviews.

The German side focused on three main points: the drone attack in Leipzig and the Kremlin’s responsibility, ways to de-escalate the Russian-Ukrainian war, and the possibility of ensuring uninterrupted grain shipments from Ukraine—this is a humanitarian factor and a request (quoted verbatim from the minister’s interview) from the Global South. Berlin made a desperate gamble on hypothetical concessions by Russia in the name of maintaining good relations with those countries in Asia and Africa that take a neutral stance—or even sympathize with Moscow. As expected, the gamble did not pay off. Wadephul later spoke quite openly about the Russians’ reaction, using a German expression whose equivalent in Russian might be “like peas against a wall.”

The Russian side, starting with its usual “trolling,” predictably showed no willingness to engage in constructive negotiations. Lavrov outlined his superiors’ position, and after the meeting accused his counterpart of arrogance and condescension, adding that it would have been easier to talk on the phone than to meet in person.

“Goals” Achieved

Merz lost nothing. Wadeful justified the very fact of the meeting by citing the need to convey the federal government’s position directly to the Russian leadership, the recommendations of top foreign diplomats, and the importance of the conversation itself—including with “opponents.” And, for the most part, people believed him. Criticism in Germany was moderate and limited in scope, ranging from Roderich Kiesewetter—a conservative politician known for his consistent support of Ukraine—to a few experts. The SPD and even the Greens viewed the meeting quite favorably. Some leading German media outlets even saw an obvious benefit in this conversation: it clearly demonstrated the Kremlin’s unwillingness to negotiate an end to the war and Russia’s dismissive attitude toward Europe.

There were no negative consequences for the Kremlin either. Putin has never publicly ruled out the possibility of negotiations with the West, and with Germany in particular. The Russian leadership’s main argument revolves around two points: “The EU supports Ukraine instead of normalizing relations with Russia and is unwilling to speak with us as equals,” and “The West will have to acknowledge the new geopolitical realities.”

The meeting between Lavrov and Wadeful does not contradict this narrative (not that it corresponds to reality) in any way. Moscow attempted to use it for propaganda purposes, but rather half-heartedly. The Russian Foreign Ministry emphasized that the conversation took place at the initiative of the German side, and for “internal consumption,” it provided an opportunity to show how, so to speak, “our minister laid out our position directly to the German official’s face.” But even from the very first signs, it is clear that for the Kremlin, the meeting remained a peripheral event, and no significant campaign will be built on its basis.

A brief conversation at the UN headquarters cannot signal any changes in the foreign policy strategy of Germany or the European Union as a whole. Mertz needed to make an attempt to shift toward “diplomacy”—toward those very “negotiations” that are so widely discussed in Germany by both the right and the left. The chancellor made that attempt—and clearly demonstrated to the public the Kremlin’s unwillingness to even engage in an initial serious discussion of any acceptable scenario for ending the war other than a military one. There has been no progress on other issues related to the hostilities either, such as a ceasefire or ensuring Ukrainian civilian shipping. Risks in the form of criticism (“engaging with the aggressor” and “a pretext for propaganda”) were clearly taken into account by Merz’s team—and they turned out to be minimal.

Europe has long demonstrated not only a willingness to participate in negotiations and seek the much-touted “diplomatic solution,” but also a desire to actively shape that very solution, without constantly looking to Washington for guidance. The Kremlin’s leader rejected proposals that would have been extremely advantageous to him, proposals backed by the U.S.—a country he considers the only one in the West “on par with Russia” and one that holds decisive influence in global geopolitics.

Until the situation on the front lines and in his own economy convince Putin of the urgent need to seek a different approach, the situation will remain at a standstill.

Dmitry Stratievsky, The Moscow Times

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