The Best Way To Prevent A Major War In Europe

We can't wait for Putin to "test" NATO.

These lines are being written during the week when Norway is bidding farewell to King Harald V—the last Norwegian monarch to have personally lived through the occupation of his country. When Nazi Germany attacked Norway in 1940—despite the country’s declaration of neutrality—the three-year-old prince was taken first to Sweden and then to the United States. His father and grandfather continued the resistance from London. Harald did not return home until 1945.

From this experience, Norway drew at least two conclusions: neutrality in and of itself does not guarantee security, and deterrence depends on how high the aggressor considers the cost of an attack to be.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, King Harald spoke of a “new seriousness” that had come to this part of the world along with the war in Ukraine. His son, then Crown Prince and now King Haakon VIII, traveled to war-torn Ukraine in May 2025, visiting wounded soldiers and the memorial to the fallen in Moshchun.

Russia’s current activities give Norwegians strong reasons to fear a direct war with the Russian Federation. Ukraine knows this scenario all too well: the invasions of 2014 and 2022 were not sudden decisions by the Kremlin. Moscow has been laying the groundwork for years: developing a network of agents within Ukrainian security forces, massing troops along the border, conducting disinformation campaigns, and using religious and cultural institutions as tools for intelligence and influence.

The caution that Europe views as restraint, Moscow perceives as permission
Today, we are witnessing similar preparations in Europe. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), for nearly 18 months, Russia conducted a large-scale aerial reconnaissance campaign using drones.

From August 2024 to February 2026, analysts recorded the activity of 144 reconnaissance drones in the airspace of more than 10 NATO countries. Nearly half of the incidents occurred directly over military facilities—including Ramstein Air Base in Germany, the French naval base at Île-Long, and NATO joint nuclear basing facilities; such targets are difficult to explain away as mere “drone hooliganism.”

Incidentally, Russia could have used its “shadow fleet” to launch some of these UAVs.

Norway has its own tally of such attacks.

In 2022, the University of Tromsø detained a “Brazilian scientist,” José Assis Jammaria, who was researching hybrid threats in the Arctic. He turned out to be GRU Colonel Mikhail Mikushin—and was so valuable to Moscow that in 2024 he was included in a large-scale prisoner exchange. In 2023, Norway expelled a total of 15 Russian intelligence officers who had been operating under diplomatic cover.

At the same time, Russia is putting pressure on critical infrastructure. GPS jamming has been detected in Kirkenes, Norway, since 2017, and since 2022 it has become a near-daily occurrence; disruptions to navigation systems affect all 11 airports in Finnmark. In late August of this year, a large-scale cyberattack on the Norwegian Agency for Digitalization disrupted key government services. The pro-Russian group Server Killers claimed responsibility for the attack, calling it a “response” to the defense agreement between Oslo and Kyiv.

All these attacks form part of a unified system of preparation for war: reconnaissance of military facilities, espionage, and pressure on navigation systems as well as critical and digital infrastructure. Nevertheless, Oslo has so far acted cautiously to avoid crossing its own internal red line and provoking what it considers an “escalation.” Moscow, however, perceives this caution as a green light for aggression.

For the North, Russian ambitions have very practical significance. The Russian Federation’s growing presence in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea threatens European infrastructure and maritime routes. At the same time, the Arctic remains a critically important region due to the nuclear factor: Russian submarine bases on the Kola Peninsula are located just 200 kilometers from Norway.

Thus, Russia’s “appetites” are not limited to Ukraine—and the Norwegian defense minister explicitly identifies Russia as the main threat to the security of Norway and its allies.

A Large-Scale Defense Partnership as a Response to the Russian Threat

For Northern Europe, this leads to a practical conclusion, which we and our colleagues tried to convey to our Norwegian partners during the annual Arendalsuka forum: supporting Ukraine with individual military aid packages is no longer enough. We must act in a coordinated manner, adopting a strategic approach and recognizing the main problem: time is critically short. A large-scale, long-term partnership in the defense industry was needed yesterday.

Unfortunately, it is Ukraine that, in the eyes of its partners today, serves as the shield that is holding back the Russian war machine and giving European countries the critical time they need to rearm. During the full-scale war, the Ukrainian defense sector has transformed from a recipient of aid into the continent’s primary defense hub. According to the President of Ukraine, the production capacity of the Ukrainian defense industry amounts to approximately $60 billion per year, while actual funding is less than half that amount.

Ukraine is capable of producing effective weapons, but the question is how quickly its partners are willing to invest in scaling up this production capacity.

Northern Europe is already demonstrating leadership. The “Danish model” has shown how partners can not only transfer weapons from their stockpiles but also directly finance the production of unmanned aerial vehicles, maritime drones, robotic systems, and artillery at Ukrainian facilities.

In 2025, thanks to this mechanism, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense raised nearly $1.8 billion. Ukraine and Norway went even further by launching joint production of Ukrainian medium-range strike UAVs on Norwegian territory. This is a fundamentally new model: part of Ukraine’s defense capabilities is being relocated to a secure rear area under NATO’s “umbrella,” out of reach of Russian strikes on manufacturing facilities.

On the 35th anniversary of independence, Ukraine and Norway signed two landmark documents: a defense cooperation agreement under the “Drone Deal” framework and a Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership, which provides for approximately $9 billion in support for Ukraine by 2027.

It is symbolic that the Declaration was named “Elisabeth”—in honor of the daughter of Yaroslav the Wise, who became Queen of Norway. Kyiv’s ties with Northern Europe date back to the time of the Vikings, not to 2022—and today they are taking on a much more practical dimension.

Norway is systematically expanding the scope of its assistance: under the Nansen Program, total funding amounts to at least 274.5 billion kroner (€25.3 billion) for 2023–2030, and this program has received the support of all parties in the Norwegian parliament. This means that support for Ukraine does not depend on the results of the upcoming elections. At the same time, Norway is increasing its own defense spending to 3.5% of GDP.

The resources are there. We must use them in a way that simultaneously strengthens Ukraine—which is containing Russia—and Norway’s own defense capabilities.

But Norway also needs something that no other NATO country possesses on such a scale: Ukraine’s experience in modern, high-intensity warfare, real-time feedback from the front lines, and technologies that are battle-tested on a daily basis. In the field of maritime drones, Norwegian engineering expertise is already being combined with Ukrainian combat experience.

However, in European political circles, the same old tune about “escalation” is still being played: the argument goes that it’s better to hold off on deepening the partnership so as not to provoke Russia. Meanwhile, Russia is already attacking, and delayed decisions are costing Ukraine lives, territory, and time—and leaving Europe itself with less time to prepare.

Norway has already set an example for others. Leadership begins where caution ends: Oslo must resolve to transform its bilateral partnership with Ukraine into a model for the entire region and, together with Ukraine as well as partners from Northern Europe and the Baltic states, build a common defense-industrial system.

The question is no longer whether this should be done, but whether we will have time to do it before Russia decides to put NATO’s Article 5 to the test.

The best way to prevent a major war in Europe is to make Ukraine strong enough to defeat and punish Russia for its aggression, which has resulted in the genocide of Ukrainians and a war in Europe.

After all, the caution that Europe considers restraint is perceived by Moscow as permission.

Anna Hopko, nv.ua

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