Foreign Affairs: Putin Has Trapped Russia In An Imperial Myth
- 24.08.2026, 16:23
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The Kremlin is trying to justify the aggression through a “special path.”
Russia’s war against Ukraine is being waged not only on the battlefield, but also in the realm of historical narratives. Putin is attempting to portray the conflict as a clash of civilizations, but Russia’s history is far more complex, writes the magazine Foreign Affairs.
Back in October 2022, speaking at a Valdai Club meeting, Putin spoke of the need for “civilizational diversity.” According to him, the West seeks to erase differences between nations and impose its own model of development on them. Putin presents Russia as an independent civilization that has the right to follow its own path and resist Western hegemony.
This idea is rooted in “Eurasianism”—a movement that emerged in Russia in the 19th century. Its supporters considered the country’s desire to emulate Europe a mistake and argued that Russia had been shaped simultaneously by the influences of both the European and Asian worlds. Today, the Kremlin continues to exploit this concept to justify the country’s unique path.
Historians do indeed find many similarities between Russia and the great empires of the Eurasian steppe—the Ottoman, Safavid, and Qing empires. These include concepts of sovereignty, territorial expansion, a militarized bureaucracy, and the governance of multinational societies.
“Such an explanation oversimplifies Russian history. For centuries, Russia simultaneously drew closer to Europe and rejected its influence,” the authors argue. Peter I, for example, sought to rebuild the country along Western lines, introducing European military practices, architecture, and cultural norms. In response, conservative circles opposed European influence.
Furthermore, brutality and expansionism cannot be considered exclusively the legacy of Asian empires. European states also established vast colonial holdings and used violence to expand them. Therefore, attempting to explain Russian politics solely through the influence of the steppe creates an overly simplistic picture in which Europe is portrayed as the bearer of law and order, while Asia is associated with war and authoritarianism.
The example of Tsar Ivan the Terrible is particularly telling. The Oprichnina he created evolved into a distinct political system that allowed the tsar to carry out mass repressions and crack down on his opponents. At the same time, it is difficult to find a comparable scale of internal terror among other empires.
Russia also differs from Europe in its size, ethnic composition, and imperial legacy. It has effectively transformed a vast empire into a modern nation-state while retaining many features of the former system. Its self-perception continues to be influenced by its status as the successor to the Soviet Union, as well as by its centuries-long, complex relationship with Europe.
Therefore, the most unexpected conclusion is that Russia should be compared not with Turkey or Iran, but with the United States. Both countries have vast territories, significant resources, a multinational population, and a history of territorial expansion.
Ultimately, history can explain the peculiarities of Russian statehood, but it cannot serve as a justification for the Kremlin’s policies. “This bad behavior is unique to Russia,” the authors emphasize, rejecting attempts to portray Putin as a modern-day incarnation of a Russian tsar, khan, or sultan.