The Kremlin Is Driving Itself Into A Dead End

What Happened Behind the Scenes at the Closed-Door Meeting of the Russian Security Council.

On August 14, the Ukrainian side announced the start of production of new jet-powered interceptor drones for air defense systems. This is a response to two challenges: jet-powered “Shahed” drones flying at speeds exceeding 400 km/h, and the lightweight “Banderole” cruise missiles—it is practically impossible for a conventional propeller-driven interceptor to catch up with such targets.

The new Ukrainian interceptors reach speeds of over 600 km/h and are capable of catching up to even Russian jet-powered drones. This is important because a jet-powered drone costs Russia significantly more than a piston-engine drone: a small jet engine is a complex component that Russia does not actually manufacture, instead purchasing it from China. Nevertheless, Moscow has placed its bets specifically on jet-powered drones—simply because Ukraine has learned to shoot down nearly all of the piston-engine “Shahids,” and their production has lost its purpose.

If the same scenario repeats itself with jet-powered drones, it will deal a severe blow to the entire industry in which Putin has invested tens of billions of dollars—to the industrial parks and research institutes that have spent years working to make these weapons more sophisticated.

The problem is that the current “interceptor versus drone” model is expensive: the jet engine in the interceptor also costs a pretty penny. The logical next step appears to be a transition to drones that do not ram the target but instead strike it—for example, with shot—and return to base for reuse. Jet engines have vulnerabilities that justify this approach: they are extremely sensitive to foreign objects (a classic example is a bird strike) and emit a powerful heat signature that is easily detected by thermal imaging. Based on this principle, inexpensive heat-seeking missiles mounted directly on interceptor drones will likely be developed in the foreseeable future, and the interception process itself will most likely become fully automated over time—without human intervention.

The first step in this direction has already been taken: testing of the jet interceptor is nearing completion, and we can expect it to go into mass production in the foreseeable future. Next year, Russia may realistically be left with only ballistic missiles as a long-range strike capability, while Ukraine, according to available data, is also preparing to begin using ballistic missiles against Russian territory this fall.

A maritime truce that benefits everyone—except the Kremlin

At the same time, another story is unfolding—one involving the Black Sea Fleet and trade. According to Reuters, Ukraine has officially proposed a maritime truce to Russia: to refrain from striking civilian vessels in the Black Sea. Formally, this could save Russian agriculture, which depends on maritime grain exports—especially since Russian farmers are already on the brink of bankruptcy after the fleet failed to protect Novorossiysk, the country’s largest port, and grain exports have come to a halt.

Russia rejected the truce. The Foreign Ministry’s official rhetoric—accusing Ukraine of “acts of terrorism” against civilian ships—seems illogical: Ukraine is, in fact, proposing to leave these ships alone. The real reason lies elsewhere: in the Kremlin, any ceasefire—on land, in the air, or at sea—is perceived as an admission of weakness, which is unacceptable to Putin personally and unpopular among the propaganda apparatus. Furthermore, a naval ceasefire could be the first step toward a broader ceasefire, and any return to peaceful life carries political risks for the Kremlin: a war-weary population might lose the will to continue the war, and those subject to mobilization might lose the will to join the army.

At the same time, Russia’s economic situation is deteriorating rapidly: the budget deficit already exceeds $100 billion, banks have stopped lending to the government, a record shortage of ruble cash has been recorded, the Wildberries company has collapsed, oil refineries are burning, and farmers are already declaring their unwillingness to plant winter crops due to unprofitability. The economy is pushing Moscow toward the need for at least some kind of de-escalation, while Putin’s political logic demands the opposite. A possible compromise would be a tacit, unofficial cessation of attacks on ships bound for Odessa, without signing any agreement.

The attacks continue until an agreement is reached

Until a decision is made, Ukrainian forces continue to ramp up the pressure: Novorossiysk—Russia’s largest port, where infrastructure restoration could take at least several weeks—has been devastated, —and a strike has also been launched against the gas processing plant in the port of Ust-Luga on the Baltic Sea, where the gas condensate separation and hydrocracking units have been put out of commission. The losses here could amount to hundreds of millions, or even billions, of dollars.

Against this backdrop, it makes sense to consider the possibility of Ukrainian maritime drones operating in the Mediterranean or the Atlantic —where a tanker carrying Indian gasoline has already been observed passing through to Murmansk or Arkhangelsk, bypassing the Black and Baltic Seas. Even a single incident involving such a tanker could lead the international community to begin closing straits and canals to such vessels, out of fear of both military and environmental risks.

If attacks on oil refineries continue, by winter, production of gasoline and jet fuel in the European part of Russia could drop to virtually zero, and diesel production would be insufficient for a country of this size. This, in turn, compounds the threat of 100% tariffs imposed by the U.S. on Indian goods should India continue to purchase Russian oil—yet another source of pressure on an already strained budget.

Security Council in Closed Session

It is telling that Putin urgently convened an in-person—not via video conference—meeting of the Security Council, formally dedicated to “traditional values.” It’s reasonable to assume that the real topic of discussion was money: oil, gas, grain, and the cost of abandoning the maritime truce. The government’s logic here is twofold: on the one hand—status, a show of strength, and the inability to appear weak; on the other—the risk that closing Novorossiysk to international trade (which accounts for about one-third of Russia’s total maritime trade) will deal a final blow to the economy.

The most likely scenario is that Putin will choose to demonstrate strength at the expense of economic rationality. This, in turn, will mean a further intensification of Ukrainian strikes against ports and oil and gas infrastructure, a deepening of the fuel and budget crises in Russia, and a rise in social tensions, which will sooner or later turn into political ones.

Ivan Yakovina, youtube.com

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