Alexander Kovalenko: The Ukrainian Armed Forces May Take Control Of The Crimean Bridge

Is Kyiv planning a "Kherson scenario" for the peninsula?

The Ukrainian Armed Forces are systematically cutting off the Russian occupiers' logistics in Crimea. Following a strike on the bridge near Chongar, the Dzhankoy checkpoint was closed, and today on the peninsula passenger train service was suspended.

What can be said now about Russian logistics in occupied Crimea? How successfully are the Ukrainian Armed Forces cutting off the occupiers’ supply routes? The website Charter97.org spoke with Ukrainian military and political analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko of the “Information Resistance” group about this:

— Currently, the logistics of the Russian group in mainland southern Ukraine, in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, are being dismantled. These regions are connected by the M-14, M-17, M-18, M-47, M-57, and other land corridors.

But it is also very important here that Crimea serves as a logistics hub and transit node for the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions via Chongar and Armiansk. Accordingly, if we are talking about the task of completely cutting off the logistics of the Russian Southern Group—which is the “Dnipro” Army Group— parts of the “Center” Army Group, and others, then this also involves isolating Crimea as a logistics hub.

Therefore, a comprehensive task is being carried out: land-based logistics are being cut off on the mainland, while Crimea is being isolated in parallel so that nothing enters or leaves it. This systematic work is currently underway.

— The Crimean Bridge remains a key supply artery for the Russian forces. How likely is a new Ukrainian Armed Forces operation against it?

— I don’t think there’s any talk yet of a strike operation targeting the Kerch Bridge. But can we take it under remote control, like the M-14 highway in the south of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, in the direction of Mariupol and Berdiansk? I think so.

This is possible because the drones we use, for example, to monitor logistics on the mainland of Ukraine—the Hornet, RAV2X, and Bulava—have a range of 150–200 kilometers. It seems that the Kerch Bridge is farther away, but that is no longer a secret or some kind of military secret. We can cover part of the distance using a balloon.

By mounting a drone on a balloon, we conserve the drone’s own energy. In fact, using a balloon allows us to cover more than 50 kilometers. In essence, balloons can even, to some extent, release drones literally over the Kerch Bridge, and they immediately begin patrolling this route—both the railway section and the roadway.

The situation will be similar to that on the M-14 highway between Mariupol and Berdyansk. The only difference is that on the Mariupol–Berdyansk highway, the driver has at least some room to maneuver left or right, whereas on the Kerch Bridge, there is no room to maneuver. You’ll either plunge into the Sea of Azov or the Black Sea. This significantly complicates maneuvering for the enemy and, conversely, makes it easier for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to strike targets.

That is why I think that control of the Kerch Bridge will likely take this form. Not a missile or drone strike, but control from the air.

— Could a complete halt to logistics in Crimea, as well as in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, lead to a situation similar to that of 2022 on the right bank of the Kherson region, when Russian occupiers were forced to flee, abandoning their positions?

— It’s too early to talk about that, but in principle it’s possible. Moreover, it might start not so much in the Zaporizhzhia region as, most likely, in the Kherson region. It is more vulnerable in terms of supply.

The Zaporizhzhia region is also vulnerable, but unfortunately, it shares an administrative border with the Donetsk region, and supply routes are still operating there. Yes, we control them, yes, we fly there, but these supply routes go toward the Russian Federation, and there is an influx of cargo at least through the Donetsk region. There is a flow of cargo.

And the Kherson region is completely isolated. It borders either the Black Sea or Crimea, specifically Armiansk. A road runs through Armiansk, which can also be destroyed and cut off. Or it borders the Zaporizhzhia region.

At the same time, a significant portion of the western administrative border of the Zaporizhzhia region is already under a logistical lockdown, while the eastern part is more or less functioning. Therefore, the Kherson region is more vulnerable.

Such a scenario is entirely possible; I do not rule it out at all. But, again, it is too early to talk about this. The necessary conditions must be created. And those conditions involve expanding the logistical lockdown to each of the sectors.

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