"The U.S. Could Impose Severe Sanctions On Lukashenko"

An SBU general explained what might be behind the mysterious flights of the Iranian Boeing to Minsk.

An Iranian Boeing 747 cargo plane an Iranian Boeing 747-281F cargo plane operated by Fars Air Qeshm has landed in Minsk again. This aircraft had already visited Belarus in late August, after which it made mysterious flights across Russian territory. The aircraft is subject to U.S. sanctions, and its airline is linked to the transport of military and special cargo on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Why did the Iranian Boeing fly to Minsk again? What could be behind this aircraft’s activity? The website Charter97.org spoke with Major General (ret.) of the SBU Viktor Yagun about this:

— Here, I would focus not so much on a single specific flight as on the recurrence of the route. On September 8, a Boeing 747-281F with registration number EP-FAB arrived again from Tehran to Minsk. This is at least the third such visit in recent weeks. Prior to that, the aircraft was in Belarus from August 26 to 28, and on August 27, it flew for nearly five hours over Russian territory before returning to Minsk.

The aircraft and its operator, Qeshm Fars Air, have been subject to U.S. sanctions since 2019. And this is a crucial detail. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has explicitly stated that this airline carried out transport operations on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, including the delivery of weapons and military equipment to Syria. Moreover, the EP-FAB aircraft itself was added by OFAC to the list of assets belonging to the sanctioned airline.

Therefore, the theory that this was solely a routine commercial flight does not sufficiently explain such activity. However, we cannot assert that the aircraft was specifically transporting weapons at this particular time. Publicly available tracking systems allow us to determine the aircraft’s route, but not the contents of its cargo holds.

It is most logical to consider several possible scenarios. The first is the transport of military cargo or dual-use goods: components for drones, electronics, equipment, ammunition, or individual weapon components. The second is the establishment of a sustainable logistics channel between Iran, Belarus, and Russia. Belarus is ideally suited to serve as an intermediate hub in such a scheme: after being delivered by air, the cargo can be transported further by road, rail, or air under conditions of significantly less international transparency and oversight.

Another possibility cannot be ruled out—the bilateral nature of such shipments. That is, the aircraft could not only deliver Iranian products but also transport equipment, technology, or individual components of interest to Tehran out of Belarus or Russia.

Therefore, I would formulate the main conclusion as follows: what matters is not the appearance of a single Boeing, but the establishment of a regular route between Iran, Belarus, and Russia. If such flights continue, this will no longer appear to be an isolated shipment, but rather an element of a sustainable military-logistical infrastructure linking the three regimes.

— U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has already warned countries and companies about the consequences of aiding Iran. How might Washington respond to the Lukashenko regime if its military cooperation with Tehran is confirmed?

— Washington has sufficient tools at its disposal, and Bessent’s warning in this case should be taken seriously. In recent weeks, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has explicitly identified aviation, maritime transport, financial transactions, technology, and other channels as areas for further pressure not only on Iran but also on those who help Tehran circumvent sanctions.

If it is established that Belarusian government agencies, companies, or banks knowingly facilitated military shipments on behalf of the IRGC, the U.S. may move from political statements to targeted secondary sanctions. It is not only individual officials who could potentially be targeted. This could include entities providing aircraft reception and handling, ground logistics, refueling, maintenance and repair, cargo operations, financial settlements, and onward shipment of cargo.

When imposing sanctions against Qeshm Fars Air, the U.S. Department of the Treasury specifically warned that providing maintenance, technical support, refueling, and other services to sanctioned airlines could pose serious sanctions risks for the relevant companies and suppliers.

The banking sector remains a particularly sensitive area. Foreign financial institutions that knowingly conduct significant transactions on behalf of sanctioned entities may face restrictions on access to the U.S. financial system, correspondent accounts, and dollar-denominated settlements. The problem for Minsk is that the Lukashenko regime is already subject to severe sanctions. However, in this case, Washington could go further—targeting the very infrastructure that facilitates military-technical cooperation between Iran, Belarus, and Russia.

I would also not view these flights in isolation from the broader picture. Moscow, Tehran, and Minsk are increasingly leveraging each other’s capabilities to circumvent sanctions, organize logistics, and facilitate military-technical cooperation.

If Belarus is indeed turning into a transshipment hub for Iranian military shipments subject to sanctions, for Lukashenko, this means crossing yet another line: from the role of Moscow’s political and military ally to direct participation in infrastructure that serves the interests of the IRGC. And this already gives Washington significantly more grounds for imposing tough secondary sanctions.

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