Putin's Dilemma

Public apathy has never served as a helper for the ruling regime in a protracted war situation.

Especially when it is overlaid with such factors as the deteriorating financial situation of the majority of this very society, coupled with the maximalist, but not fully formulated goals of the war of conquest (not a defensive war) launched by the ruling regime.

These social trends were not fixed yesterday, but today they are forced to be stated by government sociological companies, and political commentators - to try to mitigate them, and not for the society itself, but for the ruling regime.

At the same time, it is worth adding the absence of such allies, which aggravates the problem of apathy of the Russian society for the Kremlin - it can only rely on internal approval, real or fake.

And do not confuse atomized allies with the lack of such allies. The absence of such allies exacerbates the problem of apathy in Russian society for the Kremlin - it can rely solely on internal approval, real or fake.

And one should not confuse the atomization of Russian society with its apathy. The Kremlin is fully satisfied with the former, and all efforts of propaganda and targeted repression are aimed at maintaining it. Apathetic perception of propaganda becomes a dangerous signal under the conditions described above.

Important Issues

The rapid military operation that was supposed to bring a "Ukrainian consensus" to replace the defunct "Crimean consensus" turned into a problem rather than a solution. After the shock, acceptance and unification around the flag, Russian society has naturally entered a stage of apathy in its perception of the war. It has long been ready for the cessation of hostilities and clearly associates their continuation with the impossibility of economic recovery and improvement of its financial situation.

Government commentators try to emphasize the beneficiaries of the war in the broad sense of the word - the military and their families, workers in the military-industrial complex and related industries. However, for all their numbers, they are far from being the majority, otherwise there would be no problem. Nor would it have been there when the active phase of hostilities ended a few months ago. But Putin continues to demonstrate persistence in making impossible demands, but lacks a convincing strategy to achieve them. This dissonance makes his assessment of the situation increasingly inadequate. Even tactical successes on the frontline do not answer two questions: "to do what?" and "then what?". Already now Russians are being prepared for the fact that the confrontation takes on a permanent character and it no longer matters whether it is Ukraine or some other country of the "collective West" or its "satellite".

And, therefore, Russian society must support it not only with formal support for the "SWO", but also actively share its hardships. Society needs a new and non-material incentive (there is simply no money for material incentives) to overcome apathy toward the war and the current situation in the country.

It can be assumed that the Kremlin now has two tools, the choice of which will give an understanding of which solution it is leaning toward - a temporary freeze of hostilities to accumulate human resources and equipment or a new military cycle until the end of 2026.

Radioactive Approach

As always, Putin will procrastinate in choosing any one of the scenarios, and this trademark Putin procrastination may lead to the emergence of a third way. We see possibilities for at least one of the scenarios. We will conditionally call it "nuclear carrot". Its preparation began several weeks ago.

After the Kremlin's initial confusion over Donald Trump's lack of proper response to Donald Trump's test of the Burevestnik missile and Poseidon torpedo, Moscow decided not to back down from its nuclear escalation plot and even take it to a new level. It is quite possible that the decision to intensify the relevant rhetoric was made hastily. This is evidenced by the sudden and poorly organized events formally devoted to other topics, but which were intended to become a platform for Putin's statements. This includes his Nov. 4 speech at an awards ceremony for weapons developers, which he devoted to Russia's nuclear potential, the unique characteristics of the Burevestnik and Poseidon, brought up the Oreshnik system again, and de facto threatened the United States and NATO countries. This and Putin's convened open, videotaped meeting of the Russian Security Council on November 5, where, despite the agenda (transportation security), Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin "suddenly" suggested that the council members first speak out about Washington's announcement of resumed nuclear testing. Just as "unexpectedly," Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov was ready to speak out on the subject and made an entire report.

Obviously, the orchestrated statements of the Council members and Putin's reaction to them were designed to show that Russia is ready to continue nuclear escalation and bring it to the penultimate degree - conducting actual nuclear tests. As always, the Russian president left both room and time for maneuver, instructing to gather information, conduct analysis on the floor of the Security Council, and make proposals on the possible start of work on the preparation of nuclear tests. However, now the audience targeted by this escalation is not only the US or the EU: Putin's efforts are now aimed not only at creating the conditions for new diplomatic negotiations with the Trump administration and expanding their timeframe, but also at launching a campaign to divert the Russian audience's attention. It is especially important to do this at the end of the year, before the New Year holidays. Fear-mongering about nuclear escalation, and then de-escalation through negotiations, over the course of several months should completely replace the negative domestic Russian agenda regarding failures in the economy and on the front. The escalation of nuclear rhetoric in such a scenario is not a sign of the Kremlin's readiness to actually approach the line of apocalypse, but rather the opposite - a readiness to enter real peace talks. In fact, it is his recipe for showing the entire Russian society, including Z patriots, that there are worse things than the unattainability of maximalist goals here and now.

Terrorist approach

The second scenario is not explicitly represented in the media sphere and is background in propaganda messages. However, things can change within just a couple of hours. There are many examples of this - one of the relatively recent ones is the terrorist attack in Crocus City Hall. This scenario can be conventionally called the "terrorist whip". If, despite all arguments, Putin decides to continue the high-intensity war in 2026, it is very likely that the terror method will be used. It will give a chance to rally the population around the flag again, as well as to increase the legitimacy of the government on the one hand and reduce apathy through fear on the other. After all, this scenario has already shown its effectiveness at the dawn of the Putin era. Why not try it again at its sunset?

The two scenarios described above are not guaranteed, but will become obvious very soon if the Kremlin favors one of them. They are all the more likely to be used because, in the face of public apathy and resource scarcity, both scenarios suggest that society should accept military and economic failure not as a loss, but as a huge success amid the possibility of even greater catastrophes.

Alexander Shulga, The Moscow Times

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