Robert Pszczel: Someone Can Remind Lukashenka What Türkiye Did With Russian Fighter Jets

The Belarusian dictator has crossed the Rubicon.

What will happen next within the Ukrainian counteroffensive? Should Poland be worried about the Wagner PMC on the territory of Belarus? Will there be a response to the provocations of Putin and Lukashenka?

The website Charter97.org talked about this and other issues with Polish analyst, ex-director of the NATO Information Office in Moscow Robert Pszczel.

(The interview was recorded before the plane crash of the leader of the Wagner PMC Yevgeny Prigozhin — edit.)

Robert Pszczel is a former Polish diplomat who was involved in the process of Poland's accession into NATO. Until 1999, he was a political adviser to the Permanent Mission of Poland to NATO. For two decades he worked at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, dealing with press and information policy issues. In 2010-2015, he was Director of the NATO Information Office in Moscow. Independent analyst since 2020, senior fellow at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation in Warsaw. Author of many articles on security policy issues in Polish and foreign publications.

— In the Western media, they talk about the Ukrainian counteroffensive being “too slow”. Do you share this skepticism?

— There are objective reasons why the offensive cannot go very quickly. Do not forget that the aggressor country does not conduct military operations in any civilized form — we are talking about the use of all possible means: attacks on the civilian population, on cities, the use of mines.

By the way, we can talk about a counteroffensive or an offensive, because Russia may try to carry out offensive actions of a tactical nature, but for a long time the initiative belongs to the Ukrainians, and this is very important.

For the most part, I agree with our Ukrainian friends when they say that they could have launched an offensive earlier, but were waiting for the necessary military equipment to be delivered. Time has been lost, it’s true. Everyone remembers what happened with the supply of tanks, missile systems, some types of artillery weapons — it happened the way it happened, they failed to do it earlier, and this gave the aggressor country time to prepare. This could be named as one of the main reasons.

There are also more complex reasons related to the fact that it is not so simple — we must not forget that there is still a disproportion when it comes to the military power of Russia and Ukraine.

It is one thing to prepare tactical operations in which the Ukrainians demonstrate not only absolute bravery, but also great creativity: we can recall strikes on airfields and logistics centers. But when it comes to a large-scale offensive, coordination and other forms of military-organizational coordination are very important. We must not forget that Ukraine does not have the ability to gain air supremacy, and this also limits their possibilities.

We can add that at the very beginning of this offensive there were cases when Ukrainians lost a lot of people, a lot of military equipment — and this is also a huge difference between Ukrainians and the aggressor: Ukrainians value the lives of their soldiers.

The key principle remains unchanged: Ukrainians themselves decide and plan how they will act. Of course, there is some element of support, but that is their decision. The burden of carrying out the combat missions of this offensive lies on the shoulders of the Ukrainians.

Putting all these factors together, it would be difficult from a military point of view to expect this offensive to take place in the form of a blitzkrieg. I think that the expectations of some quick huge progress in the offensive were unrealistic, so you need to look at it calmly. Although, a breakthrough is also possible — the courage, creativity of the Ukrainians are well known, and on the Russian side the morale is very low. A lot depends on logistics: the more ammunition and new systems, the easier it will be for the Ukrainians to conduct this offensive.

— From the point of view of psychology, is Lukashenka able to press the nuclear button?

— I think that he is physically incapable to do so: it is hard to believe that Lukashenka and his regime will have the opportunity to make decisions on the use of nuclear weapons. Control has been and remains in the hands of Moscow.

If we talk about psychology, Lukashenka has already crossed the psychological barrier in terms of the interests of his country. Until recently, Belarus was a country with the Constitution stating that there will be no nuclear weapons on its territory. Belarus, like Ukraine, when it became an independent country, gave up its nuclear arsenal left over from Soviet times. So Lukashenka has already done something against the interests of his country — he crossed a certain Rubicon in submission to his colleague Putin.

But if we talk specifically about the control and potential solution to the use of nuclear weapons, I do not see such opportunities for Lukashenka. It would be naive to believe that Moscow is transferring such weapons into the hands of Lukashenka.

— To what extent do new threats affect security in the region as a whole? How worried should Poland be about the presence of the Wagner PMC fighters and the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus?

— I repeat, no one seriously considers the nuclear potential of Belarus — we are talking about the presence of Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus. By itself, this fact changes little if you look at Kaliningrad and other places. The distance is shorter, the time of the first approach is reduced, but if we talk about the logic of the potential use of nuclear weapons, these factors do not change anything.

Lukashenka and Putin should always be reminded that any use of nuclear weapons would be a form of suicide for that country, whether it be Russia or Belarus.

As for the Wagner PMC, let's be honest, in terms of military potential, this group does not make a strong impression. This is by no means an independent structure — it is part of the apparatus of the Russian Federation. They are used in Africa, in some places in Europe for special operations, most of which are related to disinformation. There is some potential associated with hybrid warfare. For example, one can imagine the participation of “fighters”, as they call themselves (although they are criminals), in attempts to arrange provocations at the border related to illegal migration. There may be sabotage attempts, but from a military point of view, this does not fundamentally change the situation.

Most of what is happening now is disinformation, to give the impression that there is a new very serious threat, and also to show that this is supposedly a response to the threats allegedly created by the NATO countries, Poland, Lithuania.

On the one hand, you need to look at it calmly, because it is hard to believe that the Wagner group (a group of criminals) can pose a threat in itself. But if you look at what Moscow is doing in supporting Minsk, then the neighboring countries (I'm talking about Poland or Lithuania or Latvia) have no choice: they will take measures to minimize the danger. We are talking, for example, about military movements near the border, but also about means that can make life very difficult for the Lukashenka regime: for example, Poland has warned many times about the closure of the border — either completely or partially.

There is, as I call it, the principle of Newton's second law: there is an action and there is a reaction. Today Lukashenka makes threats, and tomorrow he says that it was a joke — no one will play such games. You need to understand the consequences of your actions.

This is part of the confrontation that Moscow entered, and Lukashenka's regime, unfortunately, decided to help.

— What measures could you recommend in response to these provocations of the Russian Federation (deployment of nuclear weapons and the presence of Wagner PMC) in Belarus? An adequate response is economic pressure from individual countries, and not NATO's collective defense measures?

— Not certainly in that way. We (Warsaw, Vilnius, Riga) are part of NATO. It should be taken into account that either traditional or hybrid threats are a potential danger not only for Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, but also for NATO.

In addition, we will take measures that are beneficial to us, and at a time that is beneficial to us. This includes elements of military reaction. There are, for example, such proposals when one can imagine a show of force: if someone does not understand something in Minsk or Moscow, one can make an unplanned large NATO exercise, for example, at the border. You can add aircraft flights.

We must not forget that Lukashenka crossed the next Rubicon when Belarusian helicopters were found in Polish airspace. The reaction of Poland this time was, one might say, restrained, but this cannot go on forever. It seems to me that now is a good opportunity to recall what happened to the Russian fighter jets that violated Turkish airspace many times. Of course, no one wants such an outcome, but it could end up like this (In 2015, Turkish F-16 fighters shot down a Russian Su-24 frontline bomber that violated the country's airspace — edit.)

On the economic side, there is a growing drive to increase sanctions against Minsk to make life harder for Lukashenka and his regime. This may mean sanctions against individuals (military, officials), structural sanctions, including the complete closure of borders — I think it will be decided in Warsaw, Riga and Vilnius, and this will happen at a favorable moment for them. This needs to be understood by people who are in very dangerous confrontations.

A surreal feeling is caused by Lukashenka's words that it is necessary to “have good relations” — this decision lies in the hands of Lukashenka. Why, after such words, do exercises with the participation of Russian special forces literally five kilometers from the border with Poland? These are provocative actions.

People involved in security in NATO countries are ready for different options.

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