Arkady Moshes: Kremlin Won’t Give Best Assets To Lukashenka

The Belarusian dictator is just a tool.

Can Russia use nuclear weapons? How to stop Putin’s blackmail? How will the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus affect the Lukashenka regime?

Arkady Moshes, the Programme Director for Russia, EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and Eurasia research programme, answered these and other questions for Charter97.org.

– After Putin announced that part of the nuclear warheads had already been delivered to Belarus, the reaction of the West was rather restrained. There are no plans for a response yet. Why?

– It is clear that Putin is trying to scare the West and drag it into the discussion on his own terms in this way. This is a common diplomatic trick. I also think that perhaps the West is not completely sure that nuclear weapons are now in Belarus. Western intelligence knows such things well enough. Third, the West proceeds from the fact that the threat of using nuclear weapons has not increased, the geostrategic situation has not changed, given the number of weapons, including, possibly, nuclear weapons, located in Kaliningrad.

Therefore, the West shows a calm reaction. Putin wants to impose this discussion, and the West sees no need to get involved in it on Russia's terms.

– President Joe Biden said he considers the use of nuclear weapons by Putin a realistic scenario. Is it a real threat or just a bluff?

– You know, guessing is useless. Of course, the probability is not zero. Under some circumstances of a military nature, if the Russian army suffers a serious strategic defeat in Ukraine or, for example, if the Ukrainians expose themselves anyhow, and concentrate their troops very massively in some areas, there will be a temptation to use nuclear weapons.

We can talk about scenarios and the mental condition that the Russian president would need to make such a decision. The probability is not zero, but I think that no one, including myself, will exaggerate it. After all, the preparation of a nuclear weapon, especially a tactical one, takes some time. That is, the West will have time to somehow react and send appropriate signals, once again explaining to Moscow what risks it will face, including the military ones.

It is also linked to the first question. I think that is why the West does not panic.

– What are the real methods to put pressure on Putin and force him to give up nuclear blackmail?

– Putin can give up nuclear blackmail only when he realizes that it’s not working, and no one is in a hurry to negotiate with him. Everyone in Russia noticed the article by Sergei Karaganov, who - on his own initiative or not, I don't know - wrote that "we are not bluffing, we need to scare everyone and prepare for the use of nuclear weapons". But at the same time, we see that even in Russia, in response to this, over the past few days, quite a lot of publications by authoritative experts in the field of nuclear weapons have appeared, which say that this cannot be done and that the consequences will be enormous, including for Russia. Even in the Russian Federation, even in the current conditions when the information space is under control, serious experts come with their opinions that in no case they can even talk about the use of nuclear weapons.

Sure, we are not standing on the brink. I won’t use the word “bluff”, because the probability is not zero, but still, one should not assume that tomorrow the Russian leadership will decide to use nuclear weapons when they can come under retaliatory nukes against decision-making centers, against their armed forces and the Black Sea Fleet.

Just talking about the fact that the country might be preparing to use nuclear weapons will lead to huge panic in large Russian cities and the entire system of management and production will be paralyzed there. After all, everyone will start running. It is easy to talk about this when people imagine that only Russia can use nuclear weapons, and when they say that nuclear weapons can be used in response, an abyss of all sorts of possible negative and painful things reveal immediately. Responsible people understand this.

– There is a point of "withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarus’ in the "peace plan” by African states. Is it a possible way to prevent Russia from placing nuclear weapons in Belarus or withdraw it in case of placement?

– There are options. In case of regime change in Belarus, it is clear that the new Belarusian authorities, no matter Lukashenka's successors (high likelihood) or democratic ones (then it is guaranteed), will demand the withdrawal of nuclear weapons. The legitimacy of nuclear weapons in Belarus is rather doubtful, because Lukashenka agreed to it, as you know, he does not have international legitimacy as the country's leader.

Perhaps this is a scenario in the far future. I do not rule out that at some point the Chinese leadership will persistently show interest in withdrawing nuclear weapons from Belarus. We know that China's official position is that deploying nuclear weapons outside the country that possesses them is bad and reprehensible.

I’m not sure about African states, but they may also raise the nuclear weapon issue at one of the UN bodies. Here, it is important that both African states and China have started talking about it. It’s also possible that Russia will feel uncomfortable with the fact that it has deployed or intends to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus.

But we can only imagine these options. Rather, some nuclear weapons will be deployed in Belarus soon.

– Lukashenka gave an interview to Skabeeva and boasted of the missiles that he received from the Kremlin. What will actually be the consequences of the transfer of nuclear weapons to the Lukashenka regime and placement in Belarus?

– Lukashenka received nothing. At best, some Belarusian military personnel have been trained. However, it is clear that no strategic or sub-strategic strike weapons, even of a non-nuclear class, will be transferred to Lukashenka's disposal. Moscow is not interested in elevating its value as a military-political ally even more. Since Lukashenka is the only military and political ally of Moscow, his value has already increased over the past year, in this regard. He has also strengthened his domestic political position as a person ruling in Belarus before the Kremlin. It is risky for Russia to replace him - even more risky than before. However, Lukashenka has said so much in almost thirty years of his stay in power, and boasted so much that one should not take it seriously and believe him.

Nuclear club membership is quite an exclusive thing. There are five recognized nuclear powers in the world and about the same number of those that actually have it. And that's it. Of course, decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons will be made in Moscow, and there will be no discussions with Lukashenka. There was no talk of any double key initially. In this regard, Russian-Belarusian relations differ from US relations with their allies, from NATO military doctrine, which is discussed and developed jointly. After all, those forces and means that can theoretically provide the use of nuclear weapons have already been discussed, this is not done somewhere over a tea party by the fireplace, as during the next call of Lukashenka to Moscow, this is to be worked out very deeply. This is not the case in Russian-Belarusian relations at all. The Kremlin does not need to increase the weight of Lukashenka relative to Moscow or anywhere else.

Lukashenka is a key element of Russian control over Belarusian territory. Russia needs the territory of the country for the war in Ukraine and potentially for a possible big conflict with the West, if it arises. Lukashenka is just a tool, he brings control over the territory ready to use. That is, in this equation, Lukashenka will not be perceived as an independent player. He cannot refuse since decisions are not made by him. No one will give him the best assets that will allow Lukashenka to bargain with Moscow, and even more so potentially to carry exchanges with the West.

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