Brussels Understands How To Hit Russia

The previous sanctions mechanisms are no longer sufficient.

As of April 2026, it is premature to talk about the actual adoption of the EU's 20th package of sanctions against Russia. On the contrary, official and public signals indicate that the package is still blocked.

On March 19, the European Council was only "expecting it to be adopted soon," while on March 31, Vladimir Zelensky in a conversation with the EU's chief diplomat Kaya Kallas spoke explicitly about the need to unblock it. The current situation is a story of how difficult it is for the EU to maintain sanctions unity at a time when pressure on Russia should only be increasing.

But even in its blocked state, the 20th package already shows exactly what Europe sees as the next phase of the sanctions war.

The European Commission proposed a much tougher approach back in early February. For example, a complete ban on maritime services that support the export of Russian crude oil, i.e. an attempt to hit not only the price of Russian oil, but also the very logistics of its export. The proposal also covers financial services and trade. In particular, new restrictions on metals, chemical products and additional elements of the "shadow fleet".

This means that Brussels is increasingly realizing that the previous sanctions mechanisms are no longer enough, and Russia needs to be hit on the links between energy, maritime transportation, banking and schemes to circumvent the restrictions.

This is why there is such a tough political struggle around the 20th package. Its significance is not only economic, but also symbolic. If the EU is able to move from partial restrictions to full-fledged pressure on Russia's oil, gas and financial channels, it means that the sanctions strategy has not exhausted itself. If even such a package stalls for months because of internal vetoes, Moscow receives the exact opposite signal. Europe is capable of developing the right rhetoric, but it cannot always turn it into a solution.

It is not for nothing that Kaja Kallas on February 23 explicitly called the lack of agreement on the 20th package a "failure" and emphasized that this was exactly the signal the EU did not want to send.

The main problem here is not even the strength of the Russian economy, but the strength of internal European resistance to tough decisions.

Every time the sanctions pressure approaches sectors that are really painful for Russia, the political brake within the EU is activated. Consequently, the question today is not only how to punish Russia, but also how to neutralize those within the Union itself who actually weaken the common front.

A major conclusion follows from this. The 20th package is important not because it alone will "break" the Russian military machine. No single package will do that. Its importance lies elsewhere. It would have to show that the EU has learned to sanction not the periphery but the core of the Russian military economy. The same "shadow fleet," intermediary services and infrastructure for circumventing restrictions.

If this package is finally passed, it will be proof that Europe still retains the strategic will to press on. If it continues to be postponed, then the real content of the problem will no longer be the weakness of sanctions, but the weakness of the European Union itself as a geopolitical actor.

Therefore, today we should talk not so much about the "adoption" of the 20th package, but about the political cost of its delay. Every day without this decision means additional time for Russia to export oil, adapt logistics, use the "shadow fleet" and preserve financial channels. And for the EU - it is a day when the right words about pressure on the aggressor are not supported by the necessary rigor in practice.

Petr Oleshchuk, Doctor of Political Science, Professor of Taras Shevchenko National University, specially for Charter97.org.

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