SBU Major General: This Is A Key Risk For The Kremlin

Putin is preparing Russia for digital martial law.

Russia is increasingly restricting the internet, with connection outages, authorities pushing VPNs and blocking Telegram. This shows that the Kremlin is further leading the country toward isolation and total control.

What is Putin ultimately aiming for when he begins a sweeping crackdown on the Internet in Russia?

That's what Charter97.org spoke with SBU Major General in Reserve Viktor Yagun:

- If we look at what is happening not as a technical restriction, but as a classic model of state behavior in conditions of protracted war and internal mobilization of the system, then restricting the Internet in Russia is not a situational decision. It is an element of a long-term strategy of transition to a controlled information space based on the model of digital "sovereignty". That is, it is a variant of digital martial law.

The Kremlin's strategic goal consists of several levels. The first level is political control. Putin's system long ago came to the realization that its main risk is not military defeat per se, but uncontrolled information about that defeat. So the task is very simple: not just censorship, but creating an environment in which the state determines what even exists as fact and what does not.

The second level is the scenario of a long war. Russia is gradually rebuilding itself into a model of a fortress state. In such a model, the free internet is seen as a vulnerability because it allows bypassing state propaganda, gives access to alternative casualty data, and creates horizontal connections between people. It even makes it easier to organize protests, as we have seen in Iran.

The goal, therefore, is not just to block it, but to be able to put the country into domestic internet mode at any time. That is, to a model similar to China's, but with a tougher coercive component. Something between North Korea and China.

The third level is a counterintelligence barrier. For the Russian security services, Telegram is not only a problem for the opposition, but also a problem of operational information about infrastructure strikes, the real effects of the war, troop movements, the effectiveness of Ukrainian attacks, and the underground's contacts with Ukrainian security services. Practically, the Kremlin is trying to reduce transparency on its own territory.

- What consequences could the Internet shutdown and Telegram blocking cause for business, the daily lives of Russians, and the ability of the Russian Federation itself to wage war?"

- I think the consequences will be serious. In the short term, the system will adapt: Russia has been going towards this for several years through import substitution of IT services, creation of Russian channels and platforms, development of traffic control systems, preparation for autonomous operation of the Internet.

But in the medium term, the consequences are inevitable. For business it is a drop in logistics efficiency, difficulties with international settlements, loss of access to services, growth of transaction costs, acceleration of technical lag. Especially, I think, IT companies will suffer. Many businesses are tied to online infrastructure, to online sales.

But here it is important to understand the Russian model: the population is willing to tolerate domestic deterioration if there is a sense of stability in the state.

It is more interesting to see the impact on Russia's ability to wage war. Here the effect is twofold. The positive for the Kremlin is clear: there is less panic, it is easier to control the information picture, and it is easier to hide the consequences of the strikes. But there is also a negative: there are problems with communication and communication, and difficulties in coordination between industry and logistics. There will be problems for the military, for volunteer deliveries, for fundraising, for interaction between units.

- Could shutting down the internet and blocking Telegram cause discontent not only among the population, but also among elites and businesses?"

- This is a key risk for the Kremlin. The ordinary population may be dissatisfied, but in authoritarian systems it rarely becomes a trigger for change. The real risk is discontent among managerial and economic elites. For them, restrictions on the Internet mean loss of income, loss of international contacts, and lower asset values.

But that is not the only problem. Their capacity to resist is extremely limited. In modern authoritarian systems, elites do not revolt simply because conditions worsen. They revolt if the system starts to lose the war, and they are the first to know about it. Then there is a risk of confiscation of their assets, and the guarantee of personal security disappears. As long as the Kremlin maintains control over the power bloc, discontent will be latent, hidden.

If we look strategically, Putin is moving toward a model that can be described as digital mobilization authoritarianism. Its characteristics are a controlled internet, control of information flows, technological isolation, prioritization of security over the economy, and a willingness to sacrifice growth for the sake of regime stability.

And the main risk of this model is not protests, but the constant degradation of the state, because there is no development. Such systems rarely fall quickly. They usually slowly lose their technological competitiveness, economic efficiency, quality of governance, and ability to innovate. But at the same time they can remain stable for quite a long time, because they hold on to one core. So far, in Russia, that priority is not even ideological, but forceful.

The Internet restrictions are not a reaction to current problems, but to prepare Russia for a scenario in which war and confrontation with the West are seen as a permanent condition for years to come. The Kremlin has looked at how Iran has lived for the past 40 years. This is what Russia will strive for.

You can support the website Charter97.org

MULTI-CURRENCY ACCOUNT FOR ASSISTANCE:

Bank's name: Bank Millennium S.A.
Address: ul. Stanislawa Zaryna, 2A, 02-593, Warszawa
IBAN: PL97116022020000000216711123
SWIFT: BIGBPLPW
Name of the account holder: Fundacja “KARTA ‘97”
Purpose/title of payment: Donation for statuary aims

You can contact us by the e-mail [email protected]