Scenario For Island Takeover

On the progress of the war against Iran.

So, the starting point for today is the assumption that the US can occupy three disputed islands in the Persian Gulf and hand them over to the UAE in exchange for a military base

And also conduct a landing operation on Kharg Island, where Iran's main oil reserves are concentrated and a deep-water port is located.

Two incompatible logics are built around this. The first is the logic of coercion: the US does not need Iran's consent. The war will end when the regime's attack capability reaches zero - due to military pressure, internal collapse, and neutralization of IRGC funding. Capturing the islands will create a new reality that Iran will be forced to accept.

But the other - the logic of attrition - implies that the Islamic regime sees this conflict as a historic opportunity to impose a cease-fire favorable to itself: to preserve its nuclear advances, missile stockpile, and proxy network while severely limiting American freedom of action in the region for the future. Instead of capitulation, it is a strategy of attrition.

There is another "small" problem with the scenario of seizing the islands: the war will not end afterward. The Iranian leadership will not accept such an outcome and will not agree to peace as long as the country's territorial integrity is in question. From Kharg to the three disputed islands, Tehran will react harshly to any such move.

Generally, we see that there is no bridge between the tactical success the coalition is demonstrating and the strategic outcome - the war will not end no matter how many islands are captured or how many targets are destroyed.

In contrast to tactical success, which is measured quantitatively and relatively quickly (how many targets destroyed, how much the enemy's combat capability degraded, what percentage of missiles intercepted), strategic res Unlike others, he has no choice. His motivation is existential, not career-oriented. He cannot "stay out of politics" and live a normal life. This is both a burden and a resource: a person who has spent his entire conscious life preparing for one moment has a special type of concentration that those who came to the opposition for career or ideological reasons do not have.

He has a political instinct. The appointment of Shirin Ebadi as head of the "Committee for the Development of Transitional Justice Regulations" is no accident. It is an understanding that such a body should be headed by someone who is trusted by those who do not trust Pahlav himself. This is a non-trivial decision for a person with a monarchist background. Likewise, the "transitional figure not running for office" format is a sensible positioning that removes the most pressing objections and gives Republicans a chance to cooperate with him without changing their own principles.

He or his advisers have apparently learned the lesson of 1979: if the opposition comes to power without an inclusive process - it either becomes authoritarian itself or splinters and loses to those who are better organized.

The problem is that the best organized force in today's Iran (after the IRGC) is... again, religious networks. Not the monarchists in the diaspora. And this is the structural similarity to 1979 that analysts notice but rarely voice aloud.

Igor Semivolos, Facebook

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