Roman Svitan: This Is A Serious Blow To The Russian Military Machine

An attack on the Silicon El plant could permanently disrupt Russian missile production.

Ukraine's armed forces hit the Silicon El plant in Bryansk with Storm Shadow missiles. The target of the attack was one of the key enterprises associated with the production of components for Russian missiles.

How painful was the strike on "Silicon El" for the Russian military-industrial complex?

About this, Charter97.org talked to the AFU colonel in reserve, military expert and flight instructor Roman Svitan:

- It is necessary to understand the level of destruction, this understanding is not yet available. But if we correlate missile warheads with aircraft ammunition, then five warheads of this level is, in fact, about five 500-kilogram bombs, which almost exactly hit the target. And this, in principle, can already mean serious destruction. Here we have to specify to what extent. If the destruction is significant, if the technological cycle of microelectronics production for the Russian aviation and missile industry is stopped, then this is a very serious blow to the Russian military machine, a very serious blow.

It should have been carried out long ago. It's just that this facility was previously hit by drones, but drones are not capable of inflicting a serious defeat on a military facility, that is, the power of the warhead is not enough. But half-ton BCs, of course, can stop almost the entire plant, and, in principle, there is hope that it will indeed be stopped. In the near future, the Russians will have a serious sag in the supply of microelectronics. They will have to look for replacements on foreign markets. It is there, there are no questions, of course, the Chinese can help, but this is still a certain technological risk, and the slack in the production of missiles and aircraft will be noticeable.

- Russia's air defense proved powerless, and the alert in Bryansk did not even have time to turn on. What does this tell us?

- It shows that the attack was perfectly prepared. The fact is that the cruise missile itself is a good target for any air defense system, if the system sees it. But the ability to evade detection, in principle, is limited to only a few mechanisms. One of them is the missile itself, if it is made with stealth technology, like Taurus: then it is practically invisible on the locators. But Storm Shadow is not a Taurus, that is, they are made on a simpler technology.

The second mechanism is to reach the target at extremely low altitudes with terrain envelopment. This requires a certain altitude map, so that the missile can pass below, between elevations, that is, to go under the radio horizon. And if the exit is carried out under the radio horizon, and these missiles can go at extremely low altitudes, in the presence of a digital map of the terrain, which is sometimes transmitted by the Americans, then this option is quite realistic. I think the U.S. passed this map, the route was laid out, and these missiles could simply pass at extremely low altitudes under the radio-horizon, under the beams of the locators of the Russian radio-technical troops.

A third option is the use of electronic warfare systems. The ADM-160 jamming missile is very often used with these missiles, it was given to us, and many successful attacks have been carried out using this missile. It is a missile that for a few seconds, and sometimes even minutes, blinds the enemy's locators at the moment when the main strike missiles pass by.

It is most likely that it was the combination of the last two mechanisms, i.e. the exit at extremely low altitude and the use of an electronic warfare system or missile, including the ADM-160 REB missile, that gave such an effect that all the missiles that went to the target accomplished their combat task.

- The AFU successfully counterattacked in the south. Can we already talk about a break on the front?

- No, this break is not related to our counterattacks, and I would not call it a break at all. In any offensive operations, in any military doctrine, there are certain periods: the period of setting the task, the period of planning, the period of accumulation of forces and means, the period of deployment, the offensive period, the period of defensive operations, and then again the same processes, including an operational pause for accumulation.

The Russians have now, using the strategic reserves that they had accumulated last year, gone into an operational pause, so to speak. The strategic reserves have been used, the offensive potential has been reduced, and the forces and means that the Russians are currently producing, they are already accumulating for the next summer military campaign in 2026.

This reduction in Russia's offensive tempo is perceived by many as some kind of turning point. No, it's not a break, it's just an operational pause with a decrease in the intensity of the fighting. A few weeks ago, at the peak of their offensive capabilities, the Russians could organize up to 300 or even more than 300 attacks on the front in a day. Now it is 120, and after a certain period of time it will be 70-80, which means that they will go practically to zero. Well, not zero, but at least they will noticeably decrease in intensity. So, that's periodicity, not a breaking of the front. That's exactly how you can't perceive it.

But this period is calculable. That is, in principle, based on the intensity of the fighting, we can calculate when the enemy will go into an operational pause. Most likely, the AFU has calculated all these moments, and during this operational pause, in the accumulation mode, which is what the Russians have now, we began to restore our previously lost positions. But this is not a strategic break.

Now a new front line will be formed for several months, until the Russians again accumulate forces, withdraw their troops and start the summer military campaign of 2026. So now the Russians are in a period of operational pause, to put it this way.

- The Russian military is complaining about logistical disruptions due to the AFU's new FPV drones, which are already hitting up to 50 kilometers deep. What does this mean for the Russian army?

- For any army, it means that the enemy's army rear can be destroyed, and this is exactly what leads to the stoppage of logistics chains. Army rear is a depth of 50 plus or minus 20 kilometers. That is, these are the areas where army headquarters, repair shops, points of permanent deployment of enemy forces, warehouses of fuel and lubricants, fuel, ammunition and so on are deployed. This is just that last logistical, if I may say so, wharf for the transfer of troops, the army rear.

So, the army rear is currently being reached by operational drones of the AFU. This is the so-called operational rear. We have recently received a large number of operational drones, plus operational level missiles, M-30 and M-31 operational-tactical missiles for HIMARS, with a range of 85 kilometers. That is, at this stage, the entire army rear of the Russian army is under attack.

This does not give the Russians the opportunity to approach the front line and turn around. That is, they are already somewhere at a depth of up to 50-70 kilometers they cannot approach normally, and they simply cannot move further. This is one of the main tasks of any army - to prevent the enemy from deploying forces in the army rear. That is, the AFU has solved this issue very well now. I'll even say more: there is a positive trend of increasing operational-level defeat equipment.

You can support the website Charter97.org

MULTI-CURRENCY ACCOUNT FOR ASSISTANCE:

Bank's name: Bank Millennium S.A.
Address: ul. Stanislawa Zaryna, 2A, 02-593, Warszawa
IBAN: PL97116022020000000216711123
SWIFT: BIGBPLPW
Name of the account holder: Fundacja “KARTA ‘97”
Purpose/title of payment: Donation for statuary aims

You can contact us by the e-mail [email protected]