"This Factor Has Become Crucial For WSU."

The battlefield in Ukraine changes every three to four months.

Ahead of the fourth anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, American military analyst and senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Michael Kofman has written an article on the current nature of the war, its transformation over the years, and the challenges of 2026.

The article, titled Ukraine's War of Endurance, was published in Foreign Affairs magazine. New Voice provides an abridged summary of the piece.

Kofman notes that Russia's failed attempt to quickly subdue Ukraine in 2022 has turned into the largest conventional conflict in Europe since World War II.

"A war originally characterized by maneuvers in which Russian forces tried to exploit speed and the surprise effect has become a war of prepared defenses, advances of a few meters, and prolonged o Since 2023, it has taken on a positional and grueling character. Now it is increasingly a war of adaptation, endurance and exhaustion, and both sides are trying hard to break out of the current dynamics of hostilities," he writes.

The expert believes that Ukraine's goal is to make the war meaningless for Russia by minimizing territorial losses, increasing the enemy's losses to a level at which the aggressor country will not be able to compensate them with mobilization, and increasing economic costs. Ukraine expects that this year, "Russian finances will reach a tipping point and Moscow will have to substantially revise its demands at the negotiating table."

Russia, Kofman writes, hopes that constant offensive pressure will eventually lead to breakthroughs, and that massive strikes on critical infrastructure will make it harder to sustain the Ukrainian economy and provoke Ukrainians to leave.

"However, Russian offensives have consistently failed to achieve their goals, and while Moscow had hoped to exhaust the political will of the West, under the Kiev's advantage in the use of drones has diminished, but the country's situation "is not desperate," Kofman writes.

Russia is unable to achieve its political goals militarily, its advantages on the battlefield have failed, and time is increasingly working against the aggressor country. However, ending the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine will be difficult and will require focused Western support, as well as increased economic pressure from partners on Moscow.

Although from the outside it may appear that little has changed on the frontline over the past two years, in fact the battlefield changes every three to four months thanks to technological innovations and new tactics, Kofman writes. Ukraine is using Western intelligence, material resources, capital and technology to offset Russian Federation's advantages. The aggressor country has mobilized its resources, including large arsenals of Soviet-era equipment, and has benefited from the support of China, the DPRK, and Iran.

As Kofman reminds us, Russian forces have been conducting small-scale operations along the entire front line since 2024. While the aggressor country's priority remains the capture of the Donetsk region, it is simultaneously conducting an offensive in several directions. This is putting pressure on the Defense Forces, but it is also dispersing Russian efforts, allowing Ukrainian forces to contain the enemy.

"Ukraine's will to fight and innovation on the battlefield have proven crucial in containing Russian forces. Western support was also important, although Western capabilities were often introduced into the war little by little rather than deployed on a large scale, and were poorly aligned with the needs of Ukrainian operations, reducing their effectiveness. Many opportunities were missed during the war," the expert stresses.

Since most of the front line is in the "gray zone," estimates of control over the territory vary, Kofman writes. According to one estimate by Finland's Black Bird Group, Russian forces have advanced 4,999 square kilometers in 2025, including the counteroffensive in Kursk region, compared to 4,196 square kilometers in 2024. This figure includes about 4,610 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory captured in 2025, compared to 3,496 square kilometers in 2024. However, such advances represent a very small percentage of Ukraine's territory, and it would take the aggressor country's forces a lot longer to try to capture the rest of the Donetsk region.

"This is undoubtedly why Putin wants Ukraine to cede the region in negotiations to avoid a protracted struggle," Kofman concludes.

The author notes that 2025 has been marked by operational setbacks for Russia, with the exception of the Ukrainian Defense Forces being forced out of the Kursk region. Most of Russia's advances were not in areas that were key to offensive operations.

"However, while Ukraine has held the remnants of Donetsk Oblast, this was achieved at the expense of Russian gains elsewhere in Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhya Oblasts. The Donetsk region is easier for Ukraine to defend, but these regions are economically and industrially important. In 2026, as Russian forces continue to attempt to advance in the Donetsk region, Ukraine should worry that concentrating defenses in this region could accelerate Russian advances in other areas where Ukrainian units are weaker," according to Kofman.

The author also writes that in 2025, Ukrainian UAV strikes have begun to have a noticeable impact on Russian oil refining and energy export infrastructure. The aggressor country is facing economic stagnation, growing deficits, regional budget crises, low oil prices and declining oil revenues. At the same time, pressure on the shadow navy is growing.

"Russia is not running out of money yet, but the economic foundations of its military efforts look increasingly shaky... It is unclear how long Moscow can continue to spend 40 percent of the state budget, equivalent to almost 8 percent of GDP, on the army and war," the analyst argues.

Despite Russia's tactical adaptations, its military capabilities are not improving, Kofman writes. The aggressor country retains equipment, but suffers much higher personnel losses. In 2025, almost the entire recruitment of new recruits (30,000 to 35,000 per month) was to make up for combat losses. By December, the number of irreplaceable casualties began to exceed the monthly recruitment, which also declined as it became increasingly difficult for the RF to attract recruits. According to the author, individual Russian units in 2026 will increasingly face reduced manpower and internal imbalances.

"Previous predictions that Russia would exhaust its reserves of manpower, ammunition, and equipment have proven wrong. However, if current casualty rates persist, Moscow may have to reduce the intensity of the offensive or the number of directions it will attempt to use in 2026. Without significant changes in the way Russian forces conduct combat operations or ineffective management of Ukraine's defenses, Moscow's hopes of achieving breakthroughs will melt away," the analyst said.

Some Ukrainian units have developed an effective approach using UAVs to isolate a certain area, weaken Russian forces and gradually advance infantry, Kofman noted. An example of this approach was a counterattack near Kupyansk in Kharkiv Oblast in the fall of 2025. The operation showed that the Ukrainian Defense Forces can use tactical innovation rather than sending in assault units to fill gaps or conducting costly counterattacks.

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