How Starlink Shutdown And Telegram Slowdown Hit Russians

The AFU successfully took advantage of the situation.

For a week, Russian propaganda sites have been generating panic: the Ukrainian armed forces have launched a counter-offensive in Zaporizhzhya region, using a large number of forces, including armored vehicles.

Some especially beaten to the punch Z-war correspondents are reporting colossal losses of the Ukrainian Defense Forces (UDF), thousands killed and hundreds of pieces of burned equipment. The only thing is that dozens and hundreds of videos with verification of these losses have never surfaced in the public domain, although how could they not boast live on air about the defeat of another Ukrainian tank column?

What is actually happening along the battle line?

First of all, it should be clear that no counter-offensive is currently underway. In turn, the Ukrainian Defense Forces are conducting tactical level counterattack activities, on separate sections of the front, in order to improve their positions. That is, we are not talking about any epic "counteroffensive", but we are talking about tactical-level counterattacks.

The transition from deaf defense to counterattacks is quite a common phenomenon, and throughout 2025 we could repeatedly observe them at the JNA, for example, Dobropolskoye direction, Kupyansk operation of mopping up, etc. But, even for such counterattacks it is necessary that the appropriate conditions were created, or appeared.

Now these conditions were the disconnection of gray Starlink terminals to the occupants, as well as the slowdown and in the future blocking of Telegram. Given the decline in the quality of communication and communication in a number of enemy units along the front line, it would be foolish not to take advantage of this to improve their positions.

Also, an important circumstance was the fact that the main breakthrough force of the Russian grouping assembled in the South Donbass direction, the 5th OVA, since September 2025 has suffered catastrophic losses - more than 20 thousand people and... lost its combat effectiveness. Yes, it is difficult to imagine the loss of combat capability, but with the 5th OVA it happened.

The 5th OVA, operating in the Gulyaipol direction with the forces and means of the 127th MFD, 57th and 60th OMSBr, was supported by adjacent armies, in particular, by units of the 38th and 64th OMSBr, as well as the 69th OBRP from the 35th OVA. Earlier, the 37th OMSBr of the 36th OVA, as well as the 5th OTBr were also forced to reinforce its worn-out resource.

Also, the enemy command is now raising the question of introducing into the battle for Gulyaipole full-blooded reserve forces of the 34th OMSBr of the 49th OVA, which is known to be part of the Dnieper GV, and units from the 90th TD. These forces were supposed to be used by the Russians only after reaching the right bank of the Gaichul River, but they may be used in the near future to accelerate the occupation of Gulyaypol.

All these factors allowed the JMA to move from defense in a number of directions to active counterattack actions and their result we can already observe, namely:

- the enemy was pushed back from Novoalexandrovka, Verbovoye and Vishnevoye (Dnepropetrovsk region), weakened by the redeployment of forces and means to reinforce the 5th OVA;

- the enemy was pushed back from Ternuvatoye and Kosivtsevoye to the left bank of Gaichul and even... Let's say, more than that, but not about that now;

- At Stepnogorsky bridgehead, the DIS not only continue to hold the city, but also pushed back the enemy from Primorsky, having completely cleared the northern part of the village along road 204, as well as Lukyanovka, in the area of Stepnogorsky landscape reserve.

Russian occupation troops cannot fully counter these counterattacks now, but in order to level their results and hypertrophy their resistance, it is all called some kind of large-scale "counter-offensive", in order to report on the result that they have stopped what, in fact, was not, and the lost positions are quite appropriate.

Nevertheless, this is a clear indicator of the vulnerability of the enemies from unexpected situational phenomena. And if we talk about phenomena shaped by strategy?

Alexander Kovalenko, Telegram

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