Ayatollah Khamenei Prepared For His Demise

What is the most likely scenario for a change in Iran's leadership?

So, the NYT is reporting that Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei has officially, yet privately, handed the Council of Experts a list of three candidates for his position. This is an unprecedented step taken in the wake of his possible demise. It is aimed at shortening the decision-making time, which constitutionally can take months.

A parallel solution to the problem of "succession to the throne" is the creation of a "duplicate team" for key military posts. If top IRGC or army commanders are eliminated, their duties automatically pass to predetermined officers. The Iranians pulled something similar during the twelve-day war. Worried about his security, Khamenei stopped using electronic means of communication, moved into secure bunkers and communicates with the command exclusively through verified couriers.

Interestingly, the reports state that the Ayatollah's son, Mojtaba, who has long been considered the favorite, is not yet on the list of three official candidates. Incidentally, the previous time something like this happened, Mojtaba was also not included. This stratagem seems to be aimed at avoiding accusations of establishing a "hereditary monarchy," which is contrary to the ideology of the Islamic Revolution. It is also notable that some of the day-to-day administrative functions have been transferred to another son, Masoud Khamenei, who acts as the main coordinator between the Ayatollah's bunker and the government. Previously, as I wrote, Mojtaba had completely short-circuited all communication.

Suppose Khamenei is abruptly eliminated

What follows? Which scenario of leadership change is more likely? It all depends on how events unfold. Suppose Khamenei is eliminated suddenly. In such a case, the probability of a quick election of a single leader seems low. Most likely, an Interim Leadership Council (consisting of the president, the head of the judiciary, and a member of the Guardian Council) would take over for a transitional period. This scenario is the most constitutional, and it also allows the regime time for internal bargaining between the IRGC and the clergy.

But will they have time? The training of "understudies" for military positions indicates that the regime is preparing for a scenario where the civilian government may lose manageability. In war, real power concentrates in the hands of those who control weapons and logistics. The IRGC is the most prepared structure to keep order within the country in the event of a power vacuum. In this case, we will see a military junta, possibly headed by Mojtaba Khamenei.

And the most favorable scenario for internal changes is a crisis of legitimacy. Appointing successors "from above" could cause resistance among some of the religious elites in Qom, who traditionally believe that the successor should be chosen through a consensus of theologians. This could cause a welcome and long-awaited split among the elites and lead to the fall of the regime.

I would not undertake to estimate the probability of each of the scenarios, as they are only frames and depend on an external factor that is itself difficult to predict. I think you know what I mean.

Igor Semivolos, Facebook

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