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Pro-Kremlin Economists Predict Recession In Russia

Pro-Kremlin Economists Predict Recession In Russia
Photo: Konstantin Kokoshkin/Russian Look/picture alliance

As early as the first half of 2026.

The likelihood of recession in the Russian economy is rapidly growing, says the analytical center TsMAKP, which is close to the authorities. The signal of a high probability of recession was given by the June statistics, and since then it has become stronger and stronger every month, writes The Moscow Times with reference to the data of the Center for International Monetary Policy.

The signal is given by the center's leading indicator of recession entry. In October, its value rose sharply to 0.32 (0.24 a month earlier), remaining above the critical threshold (0.18), CMACP wrote. Until July 2026 inclusive, the Russian economy is highly likely to enter recession, he concludes.

The early warning system initially signaled the risk of recession mainly because of the high level of interest rates, the CMACP notes. But since June, they have been falling, and the signal has intensified: other factors have begun to take effect. Among them, CMACP singles out a drop in Russian business confidence and a slowdown in the economy.

It understands by recession not the usual decline for two consecutive quarters, but a decline in the physical volume of GDP over a rolling year. So slowing growth itself gradually increases the likelihood of a recession, but according to the center's methodology, it comes later. According to its approach, the last recession in the Russian economy was in November 2022. Over the rolling year (November 2024 - October 2025), the GDP growth rate amounted to 1.7%, continuing to steadily decline.

CMACP emphasizes that the "triggering" of a signal of high probability of recession does not mean that it is predetermined.

At the same time, the behavior of another leading indicator - the exit of the Russian economy from recession - is deteriorating. In October, its value "rapidly decreased" from 0.345 to 0.1 and was noticeably below the critical threshold (0.35). Thus, for the second month in a row, the indicator is signaling that the approaching recession may be protracted (more than a year), explains the CMACP. However, in order for the signal to be "counted", the system must be given for 12 months.

The deterioration in the value of the SOI of recession exit was mainly due to the accumulated effect of the ruble appreciation (it threatens to further worsen the trade balance) and the expected slowdown in global economic growth, especially in the U.S., says the Center for Strategic Developments.

With such a tight monetary policy, there is almost no chance to avoid recession, warned the Center for Strategic Developments. But even if we formally manage to avoid a recession, the vast majority of forecasts predict stagnation for Russia. When the budgetary impetus dries up or shrinks, there is a chance of entering stagnation in the 2014-2020 format with an average annual growth rate of 0.4% - and this is a likely scenario even if sanctions are eased, warned VEB chief economist Andrey Klepach and INP RAS director Alexander Shirov. Without economic growth, the budget's capacity will remain limited and it will not have the resources to push the economy to growth with its impetus, says economist Sergei Aleksashenko.

The Russian economy enters the new year clutched in a vise from three sides, he argues. The war continues to suck financial, material and human resources out of it, high interest rates continue to crush business (added to this will be the reduction of non-military budget expenditures, aggregate demand), and sanctions limit access to modern technologies and equipment, deteriorating production potential, making it older and less efficient. It is very hard to imagine that the economy will be able to grow in such a situation, Aleksashenko concludes. The end of the war, in his opinion, will increase the chances of a recession in the short term: a reduction in the number of the army will lead to a drop in household incomes, and even a slight decrease in arms production will lead to a drop in industrial production.

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