Putin And Lukashenko Attack Lithuania

Vilnius has found itself at the forefront of hybrid aggression against NATO.

With Russia's aggression against Ukraine set to begin in 2022, the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) feel a significantly increased threat to their security. These small states on the eastern flank of NATO and the EU have long been on Moscow's radar. They are among Ukraine's most consistent allies and sharp critics of the Kremlin, making them a potential target for Russian retaliation. A direct military attack on the Baltic states is unlikely due to NATO's collective defense guarantee (Article 5), but Russia is increasingly using hybrid methods of pressure to destabilize the region.

Lithuania is particularly vulnerable. In October 2025, Lithuania temporarily closed all border crossings with Belarus for most categories of travelers. This was preceded by a new type of provocation: balloons with smuggled goods (e.g. cigarettes) were regularly launched into the sky, which crossed the border and forced the suspension of airports. In one week, Vilnius airport stopped receiving and departing airplanes four times due to reports of sightings of balloons launched from the Belarusian side. The Lithuanian government characterized these episodes as "hybrid attacks," accusing Alexander Lukashenko's regime of deliberately failing to curb the activities of such "smuggling drones."

Another vulnerability for Lithuania remains transit to the Russian exclave (Kaliningrad Oblast). Historically, communication between the main territory of the Russian Federation and Kaliningrad passes through Lithuanian soil (by railroad and highways) in accordance with the agreements between Moscow and Brussels concluded when Lithuania joined the EU. However, after the outbreak of full-scale war in Ukraine, Lithuania began to strictly enforce EU sanctions regimes, leading to an acute conflict with Russia in the summer of 2022. In June 2022, Lithuania stopped transit through its territory of a number of sanctioned Russian goods. In particular, metals, cement, alcoholic beverages, coal and oil products (in stages, according to the entry into force of the EU sanctions packages). In fact, Lithuanian railway services have notified customers that from June 17, 2022, any cargo subject to sanctions will no longer be allowed to or from Kaliningrad.

European and Russian expert circles have long talked about the risk of military escalation around the so-called Suwalki Corridor, a narrow 70-kilometer stretch of land at the junction of the borders of Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and the Kaliningrad region. It is through this corridor that a land route forcefully driven by Russia to its exclave, bypassing Lithuanian restrictions, could hypothetically pass. It is not without reason that the Suvalki Corridor is often called the Alliance's Achilles' heel: if Russia cuts off Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia by seizing this section, the Baltic States' land links with the rest of NATO will be cut off.

Open military aggression against the Baltic States for Russia runs the risk of immediately dragging NATO into war. Therefore, the Kremlin resorts to a strategy of hybrid warfare, combining military pressure with non-lethal subversive methods. Numerous examples of such hybrid attacks against the Baltics have been recorded in recent years. Their goal is to sow fear, divide society, and undermine the economy and political stability of these countries without formally crossing the threshold of a direct armed attack.

The main tools of hybrid aggression include: disinformation and propaganda, cyberattacks, economic blackmail (especially energy blackmail), covert sabotage and sabotage, the use of minorities or vulnerable groups within countries, and the instrumentalization of migration as a means of pressure. All of these mechanisms have already been used by Russia in one way or another against the Baltic states.

Information attacks by Moscow have become routine: pro-Kremlin media and hundreds of anonymous social media channels systematically disseminate fake news and innuendo against the authorities in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The topics range from rewriting historical memory (for example, justifying the Soviet occupation of the Baltics) to fomenting discontent over the presence of NATO. A separate line of propaganda is to sow doubts about the need to support Ukraine, to make the population of the Baltic states tired of sanctions and war.

Cyberwar is another front. Russian hacker groups linked to the GRU and FSB have repeatedly attacked the networks of state institutions and strategic enterprises in the Baltics. In 2023, during the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuanian networks were subjected to massive DDoS attacks, and various hacked websites posted fake information designed to disrupt preparations for the summit. Lithuanian intelligence annually warns that Russia remains the main source of cyber threats. Information systems in the energy, transportation, and communications sectors are subject to hacking. Anything that can disrupt normal life.

Sabotage and covert operations are the most disturbing dimension of hybrid warfare. In the spring of 2024, a fire broke out at an IKEA warehouse in Vilnius. Lithuanian law enforcement officials later claimed it was a deliberate arson organized by Russian military intelligence (GRU). The detained suspects were planning similar actions in Latvia as well. The Lithuanian prosecutor's office qualified the arson as a terrorist act aimed at intimidating the population and an attempt to force Lithuania to reduce its support for Ukraine. Incidents of GPS jamming have also been noted. Lithuania and Estonia have complained that the Russian military periodically jams the GPS signal near their airports, causing civilian aircraft to lose navigation for short periods of time. This could lead to accidents, and is seen as a deliberate provocation to test the readiness and stability of critical infrastructure.

Russia has also resorted to more sophisticated schemes: the covert transfer of weapons or dangerous goods through the Baltic territory. For example, in 2024, hidden flammable devices were found in mail sent from Lithuania in transit warehouses in Germany and the UK. Such "false flag" operations are designed to sow distrust between allies and drag the Baltic states into scandals.

The Baltic states have experienced firsthand that the threat from Russia is complex and long-lasting. Since 2014 (the annexation of Crimea) and especially after 2022 (the invasion of Ukraine), Moscow has increased aggressive rhetoric and hostile actions against Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Although a direct military attack is deterred by the fact of NATO guarantees, hybrid aggression has become a daily reality for the Baltics. Recently, the head of Russia's foreign intelligence service, Sergei Naryshkin, openly threatened that in the event of a conflict with NATO, Poland and the Baltic states "will be the first to feel the blow." Such statements only confirm the conclusion: Russia has serious aggressive intentions towards the Baltic states and is looking for ways to realize them without risking immediate retaliation by the entire NATO alliance.

Obviously, Russia is not ready for direct and large-scale aggression against NATO right now. Russia's goals now are more down-to-earth: to show the weakness of the security of the "West", to sow mutual distrust there, so that then, through its agents of influence, to foment discontent with support for Ukraine and confrontation with Russia. But the ultimate goals remain unchanged. Such as in the legendary "ultimatum" from the Russian Foreign Ministry. It was published in the fall of 2021 and it was about returning control of Eastern Europe to Russia. And if now Russia does not have the forces for this, it does not mean that the goals have changed. The situation with permanent hybrid aggression against Lithuania confirms it best of all.

Petr Oleshchuk, Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor of Taras Shevchenko National University, specially for Charter97.org.

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