David Kramer: There Are Three Conditions For Defeating Lukashenka Regime

Belarusians are to see the European alternative.

Belarusians took part in mass protests against falsified elections four years ago. The struggle for freedom and democracy continues today.

How can Belarusians win the global war of the West against the Axis of Evil? Is Russia really as strong as Putin is trying to show? How can a democratic world help the Belarusian resistance?

Charter97.org spoke about this with David Kramer, Executive Director of George W. Bush Institute, Vice President of George W. Bush Presidential Center, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy Human Rights, and Labor during the George W. Bush administration, and former president of Freedom House.

— Critical components of Russian missile rockets and other weaponry come from the US and the EU. Are there any ways to stop this transfer of high-tech goods?

— There are and that is through stricter enforcement of sanctions that are already in place. Needless to say, no company in Europe or the United States should be providing any assistance whatsoever, even indirectly, for Russian manufacturing of military equipment, missiles, tanks, whatever the case may be technology. This is not only a problem of Western companies, it is a problem of confrontation with China, which provides dual-use technologies that played an important role in Russia's military actions against Ukraine.

So, it will entail tougher enforcement. It will also entail more public naming and shaming. I don't think that that campaign should be underestimated in terms of its significance.

— After Putin has started the unprovoked full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, the US and the EU imposed massive sanctions against Russia. And yet the Russian economy seems to be able to sustain the sanction pressure. For example, the Russian volunteer fighters receive lucrative salaries, unimaginable in Russia. What could the US and the EU do more in that regard?

— There is a debate within the analytical community about the strength or weakness of the Russian economy. Most of the Russian economy's increase is due to significant state spending. The state's role in the Russian economy has increased significantly since February of 2022. The expectation is that this is not sustainable, that Russia's economy, despite some of the numbers and statistics that come out, is in fact weaker, or at least on a weaker foundation than many people think. So, I do think that the sanctions are having an impact and that the government's ability to sustain the level of spending will also come into question.

Moreover, much of what the Russian economy is producing is for the war effort. It is not for the average Russian consumption. The bonuses that are being paid for Russians to join the military are not, in my view, a sign of Russia's economic advantage. They are a sign of desperation, because that's what the government has to pay in order to bribe people to join.

The Russian government has several times now significantly increased the signing bonus that they are paying Russians to join the military. The reason they keep increasing it is because they are now encountering problems with Russians joining the military.

The general assumption has been Russia has an "endless supply of men who will join the military" — that's simply not true. Otherwise, Prigozhin with the Wagner mercenaries would not have gone into the Russian prisons. They would not be using immigrants, they would not be deceiving people from South Asia, forcing them basically into the military (if that were the case).

I tend to think that the Russian economy is not as strong as some of the statistics would suggest. Nor do I think the recruitment effort of Russians to join the military is going that well either. Putin is trying to resist a formal second mobilization, because if he did, it would involve many more families in the Moscow and St. Petersburg regions, and that's something he doesn't want to risk.

— Would you envision some risks for Putin's power should he start this massive second wave of mobilization?

— I think there is a possibility that he would face significant protests. A lot of the Russians who have been involved in the war so far have come from the outer regions of the country where there is tremendous poverty and where joining the military provides them a financial and economic boost for their families back home. But if it starts to affect families in Moscow and St. Petersburg more than it has, then, I think, Putin worries about the potential for political blowback.

I tend to think that Putin has a pretty strong grip on power right now, but at the same time, these dictatorships, corrupt authoritarian regimes can look stable one minute and then the next, they're gone. One never knows what a tipping point might be. But I think Putin would prefer to resist having to resort to a second mobilization.

— Putin gets some support from the outside. Russia works together with Iran, North Korea, and the Lukashenka regime in Belarus. Could we speak about this alliance as a new Axis of Evil? Has the time come to coordinate policy towards them?

— One additional country that you didn't mention in your list that I would include in that mix is China. I would say it's Russia, China, Iran, North Korea. China is more careful and at least overtly, is not providing military assistance to Russia, though, as I mentioned before, it is providing dual use technology which helps Russia with its military campaign.

But you're absolutely right to include the Lukashenka regime as part of this axis. I wrote a piece recently with Vlad Kobets in Just Security making this very argument that the Lukashenka regime needs to be included and mentioned. When people talk about this axis Russia is reliant on these other countries: North Korea is providing critical military assistance, Iran has provided key drone assistance and missile assistance to Russia as well. Russia, in return, is providing these countries with things that they need.

Lukashenka, let's never forget, allowed Russian forces to stage the initial full-scale invasion in February of 22 from Belarusian territory. Had Lukashenka not permitted that, then I'm not sure that Putin would have been in a position to have launched the full scale invasion that he did. So Lukashenka bears significant responsibility for Putin's decision to invade Ukraine by allowing the territory in Belarus to be used as a launching pad. I think it's also very important to distinguish between the Lukashenka regime and Belarus.

— ... among all these countries Belarus is in a unique position: it is the only country from this list where people are clearly and demonstrably against the dictator.

— I think we saw this on full display August 9 of 2020, when Belarus held its presidential election and Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaia clearly won. And yet Lukashenka stole the election. The central election commission was complicit in that theft of the election. I think there is no question that the people of Belarus, four years ago — and, frankly, longer but certainly four years ago — wanted change, they've had enough of Lukashenka. He has been in power for 30 years. He came to power through a free and fair election in 1994 and has ensured never to give up power.

I think there are clear signs that the people of Belarus want change. People want to be independent. Belarusians want to preserve their sovereignty and territorial integrity. They do not support the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We have seen Belarusian individuals try to disrupt rail lines between Russia and Belarus, causing other problems for the Russian military campaign. Outside of Belarus, we see Tsikhanouskaia and other activists who are firmly against the dictatorial leadership of Lukashenka, who is not recognized by most countries around the world as a legitimate leader. Most countries around the world, except for Russia and maybe one or two others, view him as an illegitimate leader, as someone who stole the 2020 election. I think that is a reflection of the views of the people of Belarus as well.

— Sometimes it might be difficult to find the balance between punishing the regime but at the same time distinguishing between the regime and its people. What is your view on the policy towards Belarus?

— To deal with the regime, I think, you need three parts. The first is to support Ukraine. There is no better way to help Belarus than to help Ukraine defeat Russia. If that were the case, you would see, I think, a wave of support for democratic forces, including inside Belarus. I think Lukashenka would be in trouble if Ukraine were able to win this war and defeat Russia. I think Russia would have difficulty trying to keep Lukashenka in power. And without Russian support, Lukashenka would not be in power. Including going back to 2020, where Russia provided support for Lukashenka's brutal crackdown against peaceful protesters in Belarus.

So, first is to support Ukraine to help them win, because there would be reverberations throughout the region, if not the globe, with a Ukrainian victory and a Russian defeat. I think Belarus would feel these effects, perhaps, more than any other country.

Second, is to hold out the prospect for Belarus to join the Euro-Atlantic community, in particular the European Union, one day in a post-Lukashenka period after the country recovers from 30 years of dictatorship under Lukashenka. I wouldn't raise NATO in this context. I don't know that the people of Belarus are eager to join NATO. They may one day, and if so, they should be entitled to do so. I think the main focus should be on the European Union, and that will take a long time. As you know, Ukraine and Moldova are further along with candidacy status. Georgia has run into problems, but Belarus should be offered a vision and future that includes being part of Europe.

The third component, until we reach that period, needs to be continued support for the people of Belarus and the activists who have had to flee the country. Supporting them remains vital so that they will be prepared for the day when they can return to their country and help lead it into a better, brighter future.

— Some say that drastic measures, like, for example, a full ban on cargo traffic through the EU-Belarus border might hurt China's interest, so China would force Lukashenka, as the argument goes, to release all political prisoners within days.

What is your take on such ideas? Do you see any ways to secure a quick release of Belarusian political prisoners through economical means?

— I think we should be applying as much pressure as possible on the Lukashenka regime, on the Putin regime, and on any other country or company that provides assistance to either one. That would include Chinese companies and the Chinese government if they provide assistance. It would include North Korea and Iran. There is no reason, in my view, to let up on the enablers of not just aggression against neighbors like Ukraine, but of dictators who are violently and brutally suppressing the rights and freedom of the people in these countries.

Belarus, according to various estimates, has roughly 1400 political prisoners. Russia has more prisoners now than we had seen in the Cold War period. Both countries are run by brutal, dictatorial figures. In my view, we need to apply as much pressure on them as possible and not be constrained by the reaction of third parties. Third parties who are affected by sanctions should understand that they are only keeping these leaders in power longer than they otherwise would be.

My view is that a tougher approach is necessary, but also to do what we can to reach out to the people in Belarus to remind them and make it clear that our differences and problems are with the illegitimate leaders sitting in Minsk, not with the people in the country.

— You mentioned that the West should be tough in applying maximal pressure on the regime. Does that mean that the current administration and EU leadership do not do enough?

— — Yes, I would say that is the case. They're not doing enough. How do you measure that? Because Lukashenka is still there. As long as he's still there, we're not doing enough.

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