Dream On
- 4.12.2023, 13:27
- 4,226
![Dream On](https://i.c97.org/ai/464497/aux-head-1650605014-20220420_ork_360.jpg)
The Russians on the left bank in the Kherson region are trying in vain to improve their counter-offensive capabilities.
In the occupied areas of the Kherson region, the Russian command began deploying the newly formed 104th Army Airborne Division. According to an analysis of British military intelligence, the level of training of the occupation formation is low, but the command of the Dnepr group is forced to hurry.
Every day it becomes more and more difficult for the Russians to contain the expansion of the Ukrainian Defense Forces' bridgeheads on the left bank, despite massive shelling and air strikes. What other calculations could be hidden behind the actions of the occupation command?
Ukrainian military expert, reserve colonel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Roman Svitan wrote about this in an article for Apostrophe:
“Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced back in August of this year his intention to restore this unit, which had been reduced to the brigade level since 1998. According to British intelligence, elements of the 104th Division likely include the 337th Regiment and the 52nd Artillery Brigade. Western analysts suggest that the level of training of the fighters of the restored 104th division does not meet the standards for paratroopers, who are usually considered “elite”.
Therefore, the commander of the Dnepr occupation group, Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, will probably carefully monitor the deployment process of this division.
Just a couple of days earlier, the Kremlin Gauleiter Vladimir Saldo suddenly announced that, after talking with the bunker dictator Putin, he was “determined” to recapture Kherson, and also to advance towards Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Izmail. From his words it followed that Putin and the generals participating in the conversation were determined to attack.
Should information about the deployment of the 104th Army Airborne Division of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Kherson region be perceived precisely as an element of the general preparation of the occupiers for a repeated advance on Kherson? Perhaps Putin and Saldo can dream about this, but if the lowly generals in the General Staff of the Russian Federation have not yet forgotten how to do “two plus two,” then the logic of such actions is completely different.
The situation on the left bank is worse for the Russians. Even the Russian “military officers” themselves complain that, despite constant counterattacks, artillery strikes and air superiority, they cannot block the actions of our marines to expand the bridgeheads. Especially in the Krynky area, where, according to reports from these “military officers,” the Ukrainian Defense Forces were able to advance somewhat to the southwest of the settlement. That is, we are talking about expanding our bridgeheads between Krynky and Kozachi Laheri.
It is clear that Russian “sources” should be taken extremely critically, but the information that everything is extremely sad for the occupiers on the left bank is also confirmed by Western analysts. A report from the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW) dated November 29 states that the leadership of the Dnepr occupation group and higher Russian generals have been unable to create a cohesive command structure among the forces with which they are trying to maintain their positions on the left bank. In this direction, morale and combat capabilities are deteriorating every day.
To the point that the invaders from the 810th Separate Marine Infantry Brigade simply refused to go on the assault, since they did not have ammunition, artillery support, reconnaissance data, and also no minefield maps. The “revolt” began with the fact that the occupiers were simply tired of blowing up on their own mines, since their “wise” command had classified the maps of the minefields as secret.
As a result, due to the chaos and total lack of coordination, the occupiers fled through their own minefields near Krynky. At the same time, they do not receive any special reinforcements, although formally they operate within the structure of the 18th Combined Arms Army of the Russian Federation, “on behalf” of which they are trying to recapture Krynky. The Russian command is forced to disperse units in its near rear on the left bank, fearing new breakthroughs by the Ukrainian Defense Forces.
The Russians are trying to deploy the 104th Army Airborne Division on the left not so much in order to “take” Kherson, as Saldo dreams, but more in order to keep the situation “as it is”, preventing the Ukrainian Armed Forces from breaking through towards Chaplynka, Kalanchak or Skadovsk, which in turn opens the way to the Crimea for us.
Another reason for the deployment of new formations, which concerns not only the situation in the Kherson region, may be the desire of the Russians to make the front line longer, forcing us to transfer reserves. Actually, this is what commander of the Joint Forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Serhiy Nayev meant when he said that military operations could extend beyond the southern and eastern regions. It's not that he was trying to evoke melancholy. General Nayev, being a competent military man, voiced options, including those that were most unpleasant for us, outlining what should be done to prevent this from happening.
At the same time, in the present conditions, the Russians do not have the opportunity to sharply and suddenly go beyond the current framework, much less advance in new directions. To do this, the Kremlin will have to go to the next wave of mobilization, and here it will no longer be enough to recruit 20 thousand “volunteers” per month, who can be collected in the Russian outskirts by offering them 2,300-2,500 dollars (about 200 thousand Russian rubles) per month for service “in the special military operation zone”.
It is clear that various dysfunctional scum, who have never held such money in their hands in their lives, willingly agree. Plus “mobilization” in the occupied territories of Ukraine, which should also be taken into account. It is doubtful that Putin, who has planned his next “presidential elections” for the spring, will decide to launch a mobilization campaign similar to the one they carried out last autumn.
After Putin’s “elections,” depending on the situation at the front, Moscow may decide to take broader mobilization measures, but for now, cannon fodder is lured to war with money, “pardons” for criminals, and also propaganda. It is precisely as propaganda and window dressing that one should perceive recent reports that the paramilitary bandit formation of the Redut PMC has formed a women’s battalion “Espaniola”, into which convicted women are taken as stormtroopers. People familiar with military specifics understand how unrealistic all this is, but it is suitable as a propaganda picture for the undemanding Russian public. They say that even women join assault squads, even if they are criminals, but why are men too weak to do this?
What is the bottom line that Putin and his puppets like Saldo are counting on? There are two not particularly pleasant aspects here that we can already talk about. First, our Western partners gave us approximately 30% of what we needed for the offensive, excluding the offensive nomenclature: fighters and long-range missiles. We are, of course, grateful for the help that we have, including ATACMS with cluster warheads, but these are all weapons that perform well in defense, and we need to move forward. The Kremlin expects that things will become more difficult for Ukraine next year with Western help.
The second point is that Moscow is closely monitoring what is currently happening in Gaza, where the Israelis and Hamas have agreed to a temporary ceasefire. Washington welcomed the start of negotiations to free hostages held by both sides.
Immediately, under this cover, Putin, in his characteristic Jesuitical manner, remembered the “negotiations”, calling his own aggression against the Ukrainian country a “tragedy” that can be stopped. A clear hint at “negotiations” with Ukraine in the hope that the West might pick up this idea. Our situation remains difficult, but Kyiv is not being openly pushed into “negotiations.” At the same time, we have room for maneuver and, importantly, our command sees perfectly well what exactly the Russians are up to and what capabilities they have — real, not declarative.