Peter Pomerantsev: Putin's Regime Is Weak, Holds On Big Myth

"Globalization 1.0" has ceased to exist.

Can we say that the Russian society is “drugged out by propaganda”? Will the situation in Russia change after Putin's defeat? What myths about Russia the West actually believes?

Charter97.org talked about this with British journalist, writer, TV producer, propaganda researcher, professor at Johns Hopkins University Peter Pomerantsev.

— Let's imagine a tribunal after the war with Margarita Simonyan in the dock. What is the guilt and what would be a just punishment?

— I don't know what a just punishment is, I think there are different ways to approach this. Usually, propagandists escape. We have a couple of famous cases, Julius Streicher (a member of the Nazi Party, the publisher of the antisemitic newspaper Der Stürmer; was hanged in 1946 by the decision of the Nurmberg trial — editorial note) and Radio des Mille Collines (a radio station which has incited the genocide in Rwanda; the leading figures were sentenced to lengthy prison sentences — editorial note) but those are the exceptions — usually, propagandists escape.

The equivalence of Margarita Simonyan in Nazi Germany was Hans Fritzsche (a prominent radio-presenter whose voice was known to the majority of Germans, head of the Radio Division in Propaganda Ministry — editorial note) — he was found not guilty at the Nuremberg Trial. His excuse was that he was just taking orders, he was not a decision maker.

You have to prove that the propagandists realize that they have responsibility for the crimes and they are part of the chain of command and they are conscious of it, that they make decisions, that their decisions are connected to real world actions. The approach that myself would take (I'm not a lawyer) is aiding and abetting. We are really looking at the whole system and how media is integrated into the state: it is not just people saying bad things — these are operations used to facilitate all kinds of crimes. For example, right before the hit on the Mariupol hospital, Russian media, telegram channel — all at the same time were saying the same things, clearly coordinated: there are Azov Battalion fighters in the hospital. So, you get them for aiding and abetting, a bit like a getaway driver.

There are other approaches, and it really depends on the country we're in. In Eastern European countries, there are laws about war propaganda. In those countries you could get them on a type of speech and it doesn't matter what the consequences are. That would never work in America, for example, where all types of speech are basically allowed. And there is a universal jurisdiction: for example, even though the case was open to Prague, you could catch them in Thailand.

We try everywhere. Even if we get a report, if we can prove this through a people's tribunal (a public show with real judges), that can help with sanctions that would have a chilling effect. It would make it harder for advertisers to advertise at these channels. It would make it harder for these channels to be shown globally (currently, these all are widely available channels). So, even if we don't manage to get them soon, because they may never leave Russia, we can still do a huge amount just by starting this process.

— Who would you call as analog of Dr Goebbels in today's Russia?

— It used to be Surkov back in the day, but not since 2012. There are several. One of them is Gromov (First Deputy of Putin's Chief of Staff - editorial note), he was kind of in charge of foreign-oriented media, but you have other people in charge of media. There is no one person.

— Do Russians actually believe propaganda? Could they be reprogrammed if, let's say, the "zombie box" of propaganda TV changed its tune 180°?

— I don't really think "zombie" or "programmed" is a good vocabulary to use. I think we live in a world where everybody knows everything.

I remember my mother interviewing a KGB guy in 1991, and she was trying to get to one thing in the interview, "Did you know people who you were arresting were innocent?" And in the end, the KGB guy breaks, "Everyone knew everything."

There's a wonderful essay by a German philosopher about the Nazi Germany saying that even though it looks like Nazi crowd was under hypnosis in their euphoria, they were acting.

In 2014, Levada center was asking people, "Do you think there are Russian soldiers in Donetsk?" And a participant in a focus group responded with a question, "Do you mean, officially?"

I don't believe in people as passive supplicants. I think, people are active, they have responsibility. I think, if they choose not to have responsibility — that is their choice. If they choose to be hypnotized — that is their choice. Because of many reasons, because it's psychologically more comfortable. We know from data that people who live in the Russian state media–made world are much happier than people who are skeptical just in terms of psychological well-being: it is easier to live in this world.

Then we do have to divide propaganda into various levels. According to French philosopher Jacques Ellul, one level is political propaganda: campaigns (like starting a war or PR campaign) — very short term, very superficial effects. But that can only work if it works with something much deeper, which he calls sociological confounder, which is the deeper myths in society, like, a myth of the Russian greatness, or a myth that everyone around us are against us. People do live in that sociological propaganda — that one does work because it goes very, very deep very, very ancient. It's throughout all of Russian culture, high culture as well state culture. It has many advantages to the people who live in that world.

Then, there's a third level, which is maybe the most important one, which is propaganda being an inevitable consequence of living in an atomized technological society. In such a society, we are very lonely. We don't see other people. When we see them, we don't know them. And propaganda is that much deeper thing that brings us together in a social unity.

So, getting into the second and the third levels of propaganda, "believe" is not the right question. It is more like the world that you live in. It's not something you choose or don't — you, live in it. But could that be changed? Probably.

— If Russians believe that they are part of the greatest culture in the world, and they are atomized, they do not trust each other, could they be changed after the Russian defeat?

— That's a work for a generation. It's not belief. Not unlike Erich Fromm described for Nazi Germany, it is a psychological sadomasochistic cycle when you are humiliated by the state, want to be humiliated by the state — because you have been humiliated for centuries and you have to love it — and you compensate this with sadism. We are talking about a psychological relationship with power. That is reflected in the narratives of the product — so, the narratives are not the cause. When we talk about fighting propaganda, if you find the narrative, you've gotta fight the underlying relations. Fighting propaganda means changing the relationships between people and the state. It means a new generation of Russians — who we, frankly, don't see — who can take responsibility. That's the only way out of the sadomasochistic cycle.

I think it was a huge mistake that we try to fight narratives. The narratives are, in essence, an articulation of the relationship between people and power. So, if you fight the narratives, obviously, you are going to lose. If we get into a position where it's possible to start changing the relationship of people in power in Russia — then we can gain.

And you know this transformation has happened when the Kremlin is museum, when there is no longer a death cult in the middle of the capital city, when terrorists are no longer worshiped in the walls of the Kremlin (like they are now), when Russia starts moving beyond the cult of an authoritarian power figure — then we will know the transformation has occurred, but not before.

Can you change anything at all? How many things have you read about the Japanese can never have democracy, the Germans can never have democracy, the Spanish… — they can, but it will take a lot.

Why don't we forget about these fantasies for a while and think about how we're gonna win the war.

— The myth, shared by many experts, about "the second-best army in the world" which could take Kyiv in a matter of days, has been crushed. Are there major Russian propaganda narratives which are still being believed in the West?

— There is a much deeper myth: Russia is inevitable — because of its energy, because it has nuclear weapons. There is no choice but Russia. We will have to come to an agreement eventually. This is being thought certainly in Germany, certainly in Paris and among 51% of Washington: "Their army is worthless. So what? They have nuclear weapons, therefore, we have to compromise," — that is the argument. It is very hard to counter that — it is a serious argument. I wouldn't call it propaganda — it is based on something very real.

But I think it's wrong. I think it's a very weak regime that can collapse very quickly. But I'm probably in a minority.

— Will the global world become a more just place in 2023? What needs to be done?

— The thing once known as "the West", whatever means by it, probably, has to be redefined. We have to realize that, whether we like it or not, we are in a struggle with network authoritarianisms. Russia, China, Iran, Hungary (which is inside the EU by the way), others want to see a different world where their way of doing things dominates.

Ukraine is a great battle, but it's a global struggle in the world of endless special operations.

We are seeing the change in posture and in language in America. We are not saying anymore, "Russia and China — that is written." I think globalization 1.0 is dead. The idea that trade leads to peace is dead. The idea that interconnection means stability is dead.

We need to rethink the whole setup. That doesn't mean we go back to the Cold War — we will still be interconnected, but interconnected in such a way where there's, I think, almost mutual economic destruction if anyone violates the rules. Russia should have known better before it did it that this would destroy it eventually. They thought they could get away with it — that can't happen again.

I think we will move towards recognizing independence, which will leave some sort of balance and there will be nonstop struggles. Don't think about it as the Cold War. It is much more complicated.

The big myth that has to die is a myth that the world's becoming more like us. It's not. They want to destroy us. They want to destroy the rules we have created. They think they're justified to do that. We better get ready to fight. That means changing a lot of things. That means moving to a sort of war economy. That means changing our education, changing the way we, the media, operate, changing a whole lot of things.

I don't know who is going to win that. I don't think we can assume that just because we won the cold war, we will win this one. And even though Putin's losing in Ukraine, I don't know if he is going to win the big one. I don't know — I will do everything I can that he loses.

If you like this article, you can support the website Charter97.org

MULTI-CURRENCY ACCOUNT FOR ASSISTANCE:

Bank's name: Bank Millennium S.A.
Address: ul. Stanislawa Zaryna, 2A, 02-593, Warszawa
IBAN: PL 97 1160 2202 0000 0002 1671 1123
SWIFT: BIGBPLPW
Name of the account holder: Fundacja “KARTA ‘97”
Purpose/title of payment: Donation for statuary aims

You can contact us by the e-mail [email protected]