Vitaly Portnikov: Lukashenka's Model Of Belarus Has Been A Husk

Belarusians should quickly understand who their real friends are.

Will the Ukrainian war become a “new Afghanistan” for Russia? What will happen to Belarus in the near future? What mistakes did Ukraine make in relations with the Lukashenka regime? The Charter97.org website talked about this with the well-known Ukrainian political scientist and publicist Vitaliy Portnikov.

— How would you assess the position of Western countries today? Are they ready to support Ukraine to the bitter end or do they have some kind of "red lines"?

— First, I would like to say that the Western countries, without a doubt, are doing even more for Ukraine than we could have expected when this war began. Those sanctions that were adopted by Western countries in 2014 did not allow us to imagine that there would be such a powerful sanctions pressure that would hit the economies of Western countries very hard. Do you remember that the meaning of the sanctions of 2014 and 2022 was precisely to impose such sanctions that would not affect the economic condition of the inhabitants of the Western countries themselves.

Add military assistance, which is getting more intense every day. Of course, this is not the kind of military assistance that Ukraine received before the invasion. This is a completely different level of support. It remains only to regret that we did not have such a technique before, did not have the opportunity to learn how to use it.

I think that few people in the West imagined that Vladimir Putin would go for such a large-scale invasion of Ukraine. This is understandable, because Putin himself did not assume this. We understand that the Kremlin was planning a short-term operation that was supposed to end in a few days with the disappearance of the Ukrainian state as an independent political entity. However, this forced the West to react in a completely different way than one could imagine.

Here the question really arises: what is a victorious end, what do we consider the victory of Ukraine? Because I keep reminding that events are now developing according to a scenario that no one drew, that no one could have predicted, from which no one sees a way out either in Moscow, or in Washington, or in European capitals, or in Kyiv. And the fact that we are now in a state of such free political improvisation, when everything is decided by the course of hostilities. It is our current reality. It is a reality very similar to the reality of World War II. Who in 1939 could have guessed how it would all end? Who could imagine the destroyed cities across the continent, the huge number of civilian casualties, the resettlement of entire national groups, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

Now we are only at the beginning of processes that may have a global and apocalyptic character and, perhaps, not only for Ukraine, not only for Russia, but for the entire European or even Eurasian continent.

Therefore, when we say "victorious end", we need to understand where this end comes from and what it consists of. Unfortunately, no one can predict it today. The liberation and restoration of the country's territorial integrity is a victory for the Ukrainians. Joining NATO for me is also a victory for Ukraine. To let it be under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, Great Britain, and France and not be afraid of a possible nuclear strike on its territory. Otherwise, Ukraine may become the scene of bloody battles for years or decades to come.

What is a victorious end for the West in this situation? It is the weakening of Russia so that it does not pose a danger to the continent or the cessation of hostilities, the freezing of the conflict. This is possible even at the stage of restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine or finding some new module of continental security, which, as President Macron says, "will allow President Putin to save face". Although it seems to me that Putin is not very keen on saving face, he has no problems with self-esteem. It's hard to estimate.

Likewise, we do not understand: where is the way out of the situation for Russia, what does Russia really want? Does Russia simply want the former socialist republics to disappear from the political map of the world? Recreation of the Soviet Union? Will it have enough resources and forces to maintain this territory in unity? Is it ready for a bloody war, does it really want to reach Uzhhorod, Ashgabat, hostilities not only in Ukraine but also in Belarus, arrange some actions to annex the territory, fight in Kazakhstan, in the Caucasus? I have many questions about this. I am sure that no one knows the answers to them now. But the coming decades will bring us the answers to these questions.

I can say with confidence that not everyone will live to have the answers. Unfortunately, many people will simply become victims of global processes.

— You wrote a lot in your texts about the "shredderization" of Europe. Do you think this process is over?

— I think that the "pulverization" of Europe is a natural process of perceiving Russia as part of the Western world, more in advance. The fact that Russia was inside the G7, which became the G8 and allowed some Western politicians to accept invitations from the Kremlin to the supervisory boards of the largest Russian state-owned companies. Naturally, this allowed certain political forces to receive funding from Russian banks without fear of political consequences for themselves. It was already a mistake.

It was a mistake not to react initially to the fact that Russia acts in no way like a respectable country of the civilized world. This lack of integrity began in the Yeltsin era, during the Chechen wars. Let's remember Yukos, let's remember the attack on Georgia. Nevertheless, Russia was kept in the circle of decent states. Since Russia was kept in the club of decent states, no one had any doubts that it was possible to enrich oneself due to special relations with Putin and the company.

So all this strange orientation towards Moscow appeared, a real political tumor, which led not only to Schroeder. Many people accepted Moscow's invitation. François Fillon, former Austrian Foreign Minister Knaysl, several Austrian chancellors, Silvio Berlusconi's and Matteo Salvini's relationship with Putin - the list is endless.

Now this process is starting to slow down. I hope it stops completely. However, a lot depends on how Russia will get out of this process, and how much it will fall out of its own ability to lobby interests, win over Western business and politicians.

However, there are people who say that it is necessary to maintain some kind of special relationship with Russia. We see that the leaders of Serbia and Hungary are not ashamed to lobby Russian political interests in exchange for cheap gas. This political prostitution is considered politics by the majority of the population of these countries. So I won't be completely optimistic. Again, this is not only Schroeder, this is also Orban, Vučić, this is the majority of Hungarians, this is the majority of Serbs, these are not only politicians. Refusal of such cooperation with Moscow is a matter of moral recovery of a nation.

My compatriots also lived in hopes of cheap Russian gas, voted for pro-Russian politicians for many decades, brought them to power, and believed in their populist slogans. Not even the 2014 war cured them of this but the Russian attack. There were people Among my compatriots who sincerely believed that the war was going on because the Ukrainian leadership wanted it, not the Russian one. I want to recall that in 2019 this view was the political mainstream, many people voted for it, and now they are victims of the Russian bombing and mockery.

— What statistical mistakes were made by the Ukrainian authorities in relations with the Lukashenka regime?

— A certain moment was missed, there was an underestimation of the moment. The underestimation of the moment, firstly, consisted of the fact that Ukraine has never adequately assessed the essence of the Belarusian regime. Lukashenka remained the most popular foreign politician for most of my compatriots and for many decades. He was inferior in popularity (and even then not always) only to Vladimir Putin. The Ukrainian society had this childish perception and Soviet-type attitude, and the inability to grow up played a very cruel joke on Ukrainians. Many Ukrainian politicians, as well as ordinary people, did not understand that they were dealing with a regime that would sooner or later turn against Ukraine.

Lukashenka was ready to maneuver until 2020, he constantly tried to maneuver between the conditional West and Russia. The Ukrainian people understood this, because, unfortunately, they were also brought up in the spirit of the absolutely immoral multi-vector foreign policy of the times of Leonid Kuchma. Once again, I will not throw stones at these people now, because they are paying a very high price with their lives, blood, property and health. So, this ability to maneuver was practically destroyed after 2020. Lukashenka personally clearly understood that his further survival depended only on Putin.

— The Lukashenka regime has always been Kremlin-centric in its essence. How is it affected by the fact that Russia has not yet had any obvious successes in this war?

— After 2020, Lukashenka had transformed from being the ruler of an authoritarian regime backed by corruption and security forces to the ruler of an occupation regime backed by the Kremlin. He has no way to slip out of these embraces. The Kazakh regime of President Tokayev, as we see, has such opportunities, despite the fact that the CSTO troops entered Astana, Almaty and other cities of Kazakhstan to help Tokayev stay in power. He, however, can pursue a policy that meets the interests of the Kazakh clans, and not the Russian ones.

Lukashenka is deprived of such an opportunity, because his regime has no economic basis. This regime is also absolutely parasitical, which was built as a dependent regime, it has always presented this dependence as a valour, as a political achievement. This is important to understand.

Belarusian society has been taught the idea that living for Russian resources is a success. And this, of course, is also a big problem. Therefore, I do not think that the stability of the Lukashenka regime will be affected by the Ukrainian army as long as Russia can exert a military influence on what is happening in Belarus.

— Is there still a chance that Lukashenka will fully go to the war on the side of the Russian Federation, having sent Belarusian troops to Ukraine?

— There is always such a risk. But the military expediency of deploying these troops is not very clear. It can be assumed that this can only be useful to divert some Ukrainian resources from Russia. It is clear that Belarus does not have armed forces capable of completely changing the situation at the frontlines. The participation of the Belarusian army in such a war is becoming more and more useless every day, to say the least.

If Ukraine receives the most modern weapons, which are not in service with the Belarusian military, then I do not really understand the meaning of the presence of the Belarusian army in this war. At the first stage, perhaps, this would still make sense if the Belarusian units were trying to reinforce those Russian troops that were going to the north of Ukraine, to Kyiv, to Chernihiv. As for the current situation, I don’t see the point of a new invasion of a country that already knows that it can be invaded, is already preparing for such an invasion and understands how to repel it. I don't think that it will be the most reasonable action for Lukashenka.

— What scenarios can be launched inside Russia if it loses this war, and the sanctions continue to work?

— Firstly, I do not think that Russia will lose in this war for its own population. I fully agree with Timothy Snyder in this relation. Russia will win this war, no matter what happens to it, because its propaganda will say so. What is the defeat in the war for Russia? Let's imagine even the worst way for Putin, particularly, that Ukrainian troops liberate the entire territory of the country. The regime will claim that it saved the country from some mortal danger, that it was threatened with destruction and enslavement, that the enemy was targeting Moscow and other regions of Russia, and that the Russian army managed to keep the enemy out of Russia. That's what their propaganda would say. Now it may seem strange, but it may sound like that.

Let's imagine that not all of Ukraine's territory has been liberated. Then Putin and his team will claim that they have defended Crimea. Whatever happens to Russia, the regime will always be declared victorious.

I don’t know how it is now, but there was a poster at the entrance to Sheremetyevo Airport for many years, it said: "Russia Congratulate You For Victories". It was not written with which ones, but it is initially understood that this is the winning country. This is a national psychology, philosophy: any defeat is always declared a victory. So it will be this time.

As for the processes, we are well aware so far that Vladimir Putin's attempts to unite the territory are supported by the majority of Russians. This is the national philosophy that is understandable to the Russians, which they have always supported, always accepted. If we assume that Russia will not succeed this time in capturing Ukrainian territory or any other, then no one said that the new task of the nation would not be to prepare for a new leap towards such a seizure. If Putin, of course, remains in power, he will be alive and well. I don't think he will be in any danger.

We will then talk about the fact that the Russian armed forces are preparing for a new attack. Maybe not against Ukraine, if Ukraine, God bless, joins NATO. Maybe even against Kazakhstan or the countries of the Caucasus. They will easily find some territories that "must be returned". Such processes are also not excluded.

Is it possible to change the state through social processes within the country? Yes, it is possible, but two types of processes are possible in Russia. The first one is the changes that come down from above, it is either the elite or the special services that determine what the state should be like. And the society just accepts this model, as it was in 1991. Then, in general, the whole model of the further existence of the country was dictated by the Russian elite, rallied around Boris Yeltsin, as well as the Chekists, who then supported him. The regional elites were ignored with their views, the political elites too, the sports elite lost. This group of elites has won and determined the development of the country without any interest in what the society actually thinks. An attempt at revenge was simply suppressed by force.

There may be another option that we haven't seen since 1917. This is such a revolutionary option with the complete destruction of the elites and the emergence of some other elite, perhaps more aggressive and reactionary in their actions, ready for a more decisive run, which will have to return lost territories to Russia in such a global war. But, to be honest, I do not see the prerequisites for such a revolutionary option so far. This option, of course, would be terrible for everyone, such a new Bolshevism in its present form. There have been no signs of it. Now, most likely, options for some kind of elite consensus around a new model are being considered if the current model suffers an economic and political defeat.

The third option that exists, of course, is the option of territorial division. But Putin has managed to achieve tremendous success in the Russification of the peoples of Russia over the past decades. Huge successes. Therefore, I cannot now say with certainty what the division of Russian territory might look like.

— What other obvious processes have been launched by the aggression of the Russian Federation, if we are talking about the post-Soviet area?

— I think that everyone is frightened, if we talk in general about the countries that remained in the zone of Russian influence. This is a completely obvious wild fear of not just the loss of power, but also the loss of statehood. This is what unites them all now. Therefore, let's say, the most anti-Russian governments are now trying to act cautiously, as, for example, in Chisinau or Tbilisi.

Less anti-Russian governments, in Astana or Baku, are trying to distance themselves as much as they can. Still, it is clear that they are all waiting for the end of events, they will all make a decision based on the results of what will happen next.

— Will the Ukrainian war become a “new Afghanistan” for Russia?

— This is not a very correct comparison for the simple reason that you and I can put different things into the word "Afghanistan" in comparison with the inhabitants of the Russian Federation. Because it always seems to us, people who lived in the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, that the war in Afghanistan was some kind of catastrophe. The Russian Federation, as I think and as I have seen, is perceived differently. Therefore, I do not think that the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan was perceived in some Russian outback and in Ukraine or Belarus in the same way, with the same emotions. I don't really think that the war in Afghanistan destroyed Russia.

It showed the inability to act in the conditions of a partisan war in the mountains with a state whose civilizational foundations were extremely far from the Soviet Union. By the way, the United States has the same problem, as you remember. This is not the only Russian problem. Ukraine cannot be Afghanistan for the reasons that, firstly, in modern Russia this territory is perceived not as someone else's, but as one's own, this is a different attitude.

Secondly, there are no such sharp linguistic or civilizational differences. In this regard, you also need to understand that this war is perceived differently. Thirdly, if we talk about a direct analogy, then the consequences of the long-term conflict for Russia are unknown, and not only this can predetermine some destructive processes in the Russian state.

There is another question: what will happen to Ukraine if it becomes a "new Afghanistan"? It is not known what consequences will come if "Afghanistan" appears literally in the center of Europe. What goals will Russia achieve then?

Russia has already occupied a territory that is almost equal to the Apennine Peninsula. 20% of the territory of Ukraine, which is now under occupation, is almost all of Italy. There are such indicators as the number of the population, problems of adaptation to this crisis, migration problems, environmental problems. There are, among other things, nuclear power plants, hydroelectric power plants. There was not so much of all this in Afghanistan, there was no atomic energy at all. Thus, events will be worse than in Afghanistan, this conflict will last longer. Perhaps, we will talk not only about the end of Russia but also about the end of Europe.

— Do you see any new unions and alliances that can be a worthy response to aggression from dictatorial countries?

— NATO is a sufficiently effective and adequate alliance that can defend itself against dictators. All the arguments that “NATO is ineffective” are false stories. Nothing is happening on NATO territory as we see. If this happens, if Russia decides to do this, then yes, I will have to say that this is a completely different situation, this is the Third World War. I still see no reason to believe that the European continent will hide in sea waters under nuclear strikes. I believe that nothing will happen on NATO territory. All these new circumstances are rather self-justification.

I want to repeat, that if Ukraine could restore its territorial integrity and become a member of NATO, then our ordeals would have ended long ago. Just as this ended for Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and those countries that were in the Warsaw Pact or the Soviet Union. Problems would then begin for those countries that are not part of NATO and are former Soviet republics. TThen Russia would switch to Kazakhstan, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the countries of Central Asia.

In fact, I do not see any need to create new alliances. All those proposals from London and so on are completely different kinds of commitments that do not guarantee mutual protection, as is the case with NATO. I should say that if we received guarantees from the United Kingdom and the United States that they would fight with us in the event of an attack on us, regardless of the results of the events, then I could not understand what prevents them from doing it now.

— How can events develop in Belarus in the near future?

— I believe it has a huge problem with the preservation of statehood at this stage. Because Russia will always try to do everything possible to annex Belarus, regardless of relations with Kyiv. Russia believes that it will be easier and that there will be no such resistance to annexation on Belarusian territory as in Ukraine.

The Belarusian people still have quite complicated work ahead, first of all, to consolidate their own identity, to return their own language, their own history, and national symbols. Belarus has no incentive to exist without it but it turns into just an appendix of the Russian Federation with incomprehensible sovereignty for the sake of an extra seat in the UN for Russia.

There is a question of whether Belarusian society is ready to work on itself. When it understands that the state is not created for the sake of prosperity, companies are created for the sake of prosperity, and the state is created solely as a national asylum.

Belarus is the national asylum of Belarusians. Just like Ukraine is the national asylum of Ukrainians. There is no other sacred meaning in the existence of these countries on the political map of the world. If these countries do not want to be national asylums, they can become part of the territory of another country, in our case Russia.

Ukrainians have already shown that they are ready to fight for their shelter. Belarusians will also have to fight for their shelter. To fight, realizing that the entire period of Lukashenka's rule is a period of an occupational nature, a period when people who do not have a national identity, who are not able to understand why the Belarusian state is needed, are in power. These people perceived the country as a kind of tool for profit, using the resources of a neighboring state for this profit with the support of an infantile society, far from understanding its tasks.

The war between Ukraine and Russia was supposed to be a kick-start for the emergence of the Belarusian people. Not just as a political community, but as people who understand the importance of their own identity.

Belarus will follow the fate of Veliky Novhorod, where there was also an independent political nation, if this understanding does not come in the 20s of the 21st century. But it was destroyed by the Russians, Moscow, Ivan the Terrible, turned into a provincial appendage to the Leningrad region. I fully admit that the union of Vladimir Putin and Aliaksandr Lukashenka can become such a collective Ivan the Terrible for the Belarusian national future.

— How likely is this outcome?

— It is impossible to foresee what national energy is capable of. When in 2020 there were demonstrations for the resignation of Lukashenka and against the falsification of the presidential elections, I did not imagine that in a few days white red and white flags would appear on the streets of Minsk. I did not expect that Lukashenka's model of Belarus, which began in 1994, would turn out to be just a husk. It will subside by itself in the event of the collapse of Lukashenka, as well as the expulsion of Russians from the Belarusian land, both the army and the state.

The fact that Belarus has become a base for an attack on Ukraine will always be a trauma for the Belarusian people. Of course, the Belarusians will have to tell themselves in very simple words that the Russians, as a state-forming nation, are the enemies of Belarus. A Russian is the enemy of a Belarusian. Because it was Russian connivance with the Putin regime, it was Russian acceptance of chauvinism and atrocities that led to the fact that they used the territory of the “union state”, the people who were benevolent towards them, in order to draw him into their crimes. Therefore, the national identification of Belarusians should begin with a clear understanding of who their friends are in neighboring countries. And these are Ukrainians, Poles, Lithuanians, and who are their real, irreconcilable, vile, malicious enemies. This is the Russian Federation and these are the Russians who support Vladimir Putin.

If you like this article, you can support the website Charter97.org

MULTI-CURRENCY ACCOUNT FOR ASSISTANCE:

Bank's name: Bank Millennium S.A.
Address: ul. Stanislawa Zaryna, 2A, 02-593, Warszawa
IBAN: PL 97 1160 2202 0000 0002 1671 1123
SWIFT: BIGBPLPW
Name of the account holder: Fundacja “KARTA ‘97”
Purpose/title of payment: Donation for statuary aims

You can contact us by the e-mail [email protected]