A Dilemma For The West

An extremely dangerous scenario for a future global conflict is emerging.

There’s a lot of talk about NATO right now. Do we need it or not? Does the Alliance have a future? Are there prospects for it? Do they see a place for Ukraine there or not? But against this backdrop, we seem to be forgetting the most important thing. Do real military alliances even exist in the modern world? And can we even say today that anyone has true military allies? First and foremost, of course, we’re interested in the countries of the democratic world. Because, oddly enough, things are going quite well among undemocratic states that have alliances.

We perceive NATO as a military-political alliance. And, by and large, that is exactly what it is. The alliance was formed during the Cold War to counter the spread of global communism, the influence of the USSR, and to contain that influence. But when we talk about a military alliance, we usually mean something quite simple. Its members will fight for one another if war breaks out. This is precisely the defining characteristic of allies.

When people in Ukraine say “our allies,” there is a serious problem here. Ukraine has no allies in the strict sense of the word, because there is not a single state that has made a specific commitment to enter the war on Ukraine’s side in the event of an attack against it. This is one of the main reasons why Ukraine is currently fighting on its own. It does have partners. They may or may not provide weapons; they may claim they have no missiles; they may use their cooperation with Ukraine to advance their own goals, which are sometimes quite far removed from Ukrainian interests. But these are precisely partners, not allies.

Ukraine has no allies at present and, by and large, probably will not have any—at least not as long as the threat from Russia persists. And this threat shows no signs of disappearing. The only scenario in which other states could automatically become Ukraine’s allies in this war is if Russia were to attack them at the same time. But for now, such a scenario remains purely hypothetical.

Now, regarding NATO. We are familiar with the relevant founding documents and the legendary Article 5, which is generally understood as a guarantee of a military response to aggression against any member of the Alliance. In practice, however, things are not that simple. Following an attack, member states hold consultations and must then determine the nature of the response—whether military or non-military.

Article 5 has been invoked only once: after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States. The U.S. declared the events an act of aggression, after which a war began in the Middle East. However, not all NATO member states interpreted this in the same way, and not all of them supported the United States through military means. Although at that time, supporting Washington was quite advantageous. The U.S. was at the height of its geopolitical power. And yet, even then, not all Alliance member states took direct military action. There were simply no other examples of Article 5 being invoked.

Therefore, no one really knows what would happen if a country the size of Estonia or Lithuania were to come under attack. What exactly would the other NATO members do? How far would they be willing to go? In this sense, NATO today remains a sort of “black box.” We will only find out whether it exists as a fully-fledged military alliance when this mechanism has to be put to the test.

But there is a broader question here. Why have modern alliances become so unreliable in the first place? Why was NATO perceived during the Cold War as something serious, rock-solid, and stable, while now it appears to be merely a relatively reliable structure whose true strength is unknown to anyone? The answer is quite simple. Global politics, international relations, and the domestic policies of democratic states have changed significantly.

Democratic states are heavily dependent on public sentiment. And their citizens do not want wars. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was perceived by a significant portion of Western societies as a major threat to their way of life, one that had to be contained at virtually any cost. Today, there are also quite positive sentiments toward Russia in Europe. But that is not even the main point. The main thing is that no one wants to go to war. This is one of the key characteristics of the modern West. It is consistently reflected in various public opinion polls. A significant portion of citizens do not want to go to war even for their own country, let alone for other countries.

So let’s imagine that one of the NATO member states comes under attack. The other member states are immediately faced with a choice: Should they send troops there, or not? On the one hand, there are, of course, alliance obligations. On the other hand, sending troops is almost guaranteed to trigger a serious domestic political crisis. The opposition will immediately accuse the government of dragging the country into a war whose purpose is unclear, and will ask a simple question: why do we need this?

Incidentally, there is nothing fundamentally new about this. Before the start of World War II, a well-known expression was popular in France: “Why die for Danzig?” Danzig (now Gdańsk, Poland) had a specific international status at the time. The issue of Danzig became one of the flashpoints leading up to the outbreak of World War II. France had obligations to Poland that required it to enter the war in the event of an attack against Poland. But the slogan expressing a reluctance to “die for Danzig” was quite popular.

Today, there’s no real need to come up with new slogans. It’s enough to replace “Danzig” with the name of any city in Poland or the Baltic states. And you’ll end up with a perfectly modern formula for European politics. Because the very attitudes of European societies have changed. Many people do not want to fulfill any obligations if that means a radical disruption of their accustomed way of life. And this, it seems to me, is the main problem with modern military alliances.

Why wasn’t Ukraine admitted to NATO? This is, of course, not the only reason, but one of them is that Ukraine’s membership would automatically confront the Alliance with the prospect of an actual war. Everyone understands that Russia views Ukraine as one of the main targets of its imperial policy. The annexation of Ukraine is embedded in Russian imperial ideology. Consequently, if Ukraine becomes a member of NATO, there is a very high probability that sooner or later the Alliance will have to respond to Russian aggression against it. And then all NATO member states will immediately face a choice. To fight for Ukraine or not?

Clearly, the West understands this dilemma perfectly well. And no one wants a situation in which a reluctance to fight for a Ukraine that has already been admitted to NATO would instantly expose the weakness of the entire Alliance. From this perspective, it is much more convenient to postpone the issue. First, hypothetically speaking, let Ukraine exist outside NATO; then, at some point, Russia might try to test the resolve of the Baltic states, and only then will the Alliance face a real crisis. This gives Western societies years—and perhaps even decades—of relatively peaceful life. This is a pragmatic approach. But it does not eliminate the problem itself.

Because real military-political alliances do exist in the modern world. The most striking example is the alliance between Russia and North Korea. This is a very real military-political alliance with genuine mutual support. Russia is waging war against Ukraine, and North Korea is sending troops. Reports are now emerging about the formation of a new corps numbering up to 30,000 military personnel. Furthermore, there is talk of deploying North Korean missile forces and North Korean ballistic missiles against Ukraine. This is what a real alliance looks like. Allies fight for their allies.

Can you imagine anything like this in the modern Western world? What other examples are there? The United States helps Israel and participates alongside it in military operations. But even this is already drawing serious domestic criticism within the U.S. itself, and it’s impossible to be certain that such a model will last long. By and large, almost no one in the West wants to fight for one another. Moreover, many are not particularly eager to fight even for themselves, as sociological data—for example, in Germany—shows.

And this raises another telling issue. Germany is beginning to expand its armed forces, implementing plans to create the largest non-nuclear military force in Europe. But it is already facing difficulties in recruiting for the army. Even with numerous benefits, preferential treatment, and financial incentives, people are not particularly eager to enlist. Consequently, there is discussion about conscription and other non-voluntary methods of staffing the armed forces. If society is barely willing to fight for itself, it is even harder to imagine that it would fight enthusiastically for other countries.

On the other hand, we see the so-called “axis of evil.” Numerous undemocratic regimes where public opinion simply does not play such a role. If Kim Jong-un orders the mobilization of a million people, they will be mobilized and sent to the front. Including, if necessary, against Europe itself. And this, in my view, is one of the biggest challenges facing the Western democratic world in the future.

Faith in the alliance commitments between Western states is gradually fading. Right now, people are trying to explain this by saying that Ukraine is supposedly a special case. They argue that what is happening in Ukraine should not be extrapolated to other countries. Ukraine is fighting on its own, but if NATO member states are ever directly attacked, then things will get serious. Allies will enter the war, armies will be ready, and all the mechanisms will kick in. It seems to me that this is an illusion.

Western countries talk about preparing, but they often prefer to wait and hope that the situation will somehow resolve itself. Perhaps they’ll manage to reach an agreement with the Russian elite, start buying Russian gas again, restore economic incentives, and convince Moscow to think about European money rather than bombs for Europe. But that, too, is an illusion.

Sooner or later, the resilience of the Western security system will be put to the test. And the issue here is not whether NATO is “good” or “bad” in and of itself. NATO is, to a large extent, a relic of the Cold War. During the Cold War, it was an absolutely real and effective tool that kept the USSR in check for decades. As a result of this confrontation, the Soviet Union collapsed. In this sense, NATO won the Cold War. But after the end of the Cold War, the Alliance found itself in a completely different political reality. And this is not so much a problem with NATO itself as it is a problem with Western civilization and the approaches that Western politicians are demonstrating today. One may choose to acknowledge this reality or not, but it will not disappear because of that.

What conclusion can be drawn from this? Today, states must rely first and foremost on themselves. And Ukraine, it seems to me, should already be thinking about a post-NATO world. Because if NATO sooner or later weakens or disintegrates for the reasons discussed above, the states of Eastern Europe will not simply vanish. They will remain close to Russia and face a massive security vacuum. And here, too, they may have something to offer Ukraine.

In this sense, the legendary idea of the “Intermarium”—which has taken a back seat today amid the deterioration of Ukrainian-Polish relations—does not seem pointless at all. If Russia is a real—rather than an imagined—political threat to several countries, they will have to learn to live with it one way or another. And in such a situation, it is much easier to create a real alliance—rather than a virtual construct—if each of these states understands that it could face Russian aggression literally tomorrow. This is precisely what could potentially become one of the most effective pillars of Ukrainian foreign policy. Perhaps, in this way, it will eventually be possible to form at least some kind of real circle of allies for Ukraine. Although right now this does not seem to be an obvious, simple, or quick task.

The other countries also face very difficult times ahead. Old alliances may weaken. The United States will be less and less willing to automatically defend anyone. The largest European states will also prioritize their own security. At the same time, alliances among undemocratic states may become increasingly strong. As a result, an extremely dangerous model of future global conflict is emerging: undemocratic regimes may enter such a conflict more consolidated, more mobilized, and with a clearer understanding of their mutual obligations than democratic states. And this, too, must be taken into account.

Petro Oleshchuk, Ph.D. in Political Science, Professor at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, exclusively for Charter97.org

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