Arkady Moshes: Lukashenka Regime Has No Claiming Power Groups

The struggle for power will take place along a different line.

Why does the Belarusian regime need to strengthen control on the border with Russia? Should the West talk to the Belarusian ruler? How did Lukashenka's illness become a political factor?

Arkady Moshes, Programme Director for Russia, EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and Eurasia research programme at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, gave Charter97.org his answers to these and other questions.

– Lukashenka suddenly began to say that "no one is going to attack Belarus." What led to this change in the rhetorics of the Belarusian ruler?

– Lukashenka is trying to slightly lower the tensions in his relations with the West. Perhaps he proceeds from the fact that it is necessary to begin to calm the situation inside the country in this way. He understands that there is practically a national Belarusian consensus on the need to prevent the country from direct involvement in the war of Russia against Ukraine, although it is already participating in it. And attempts to further raise the level that “someone is about to attack Belarus” and “you need to be ready” lead to excessive nervousness within the country. It doesn’t benefit Lukashenka right now, so he is trying, let’s say, to turn back.

In fact, the reasons may be much more prosaic. Everyone is used to the fact that Lukashenka is absolutely inconsistent, today he says one thing and tomorrow another. Perhaps he no longer remembers what he said a month ago. Perhaps there is no deeper meaning to be found there.

– You touched upon the topic of relations with the West. What do you think, is it appropriate to talk with the Belarusian ruler today?

– I think that talking to him is absolutely inappropriate, it does not make any sense. An ultimatum is the simple and only possible way to talk to him. In order to think about the possibility of a conversation with him, Lukashenka must release all political prisoners, rehabilitate them, apologize if possible, and compensate for moral and physical damage. After that, only some first contacts with Lukashenka can begin, because in this way he will demonstrate at least some minimum level of seriousness of his intentions. Until he does this, talking to him is useless and counterproductive, because by and large there is no agenda. Lukashenka is not a subject in terms of international affairs. Minsk is now completely subordinate to Moscow. He still keeps some slight freedom of choice in domestic political affairs. However, it’s my personal opinion.

It should not be forgotten and disregarded that there are groups of people in the West who have never given up on the idea of talking to Lukashenka. They have always been there, in 2020 they kept talking about some kind of national dialogue. They were in 2021 during the crisis with migrants, they said that it was necessary to somehow negotiate with Lukashenka and make concessions. There are still such people. They are always looking for some factors or facts that would speak in favour of Lukashenka. They used to say: "Well, he does not recognize Pushilin." When he meets with Pushilin, they say that after all the Belarusian army does not participate in hostilities and that in the past few months, allegedly, no shots were fired on Ukraine from the territory of Belarus. These people exist, they are not the majority, but they have not disappeared anywhere and reflect certain views of certain groups of people.

Today, this does not mean that these people can advance their agenda. No one will seriously talk with Lukashenka today, but the very fact that these groups have survived and are quite active should also be taken into account.

– There is another oddity. Checkpoints and passport control appeared at the borders with the Russian Federation. Why did Lukashenka need this?

– I think that it was not Lukashenka who needed it. The absence of any noticeable reaction to this from Moscow and the fact that they did not touch him in any way in this regard, indicates that they came to an agreement with the Kremlin. It is beneficial both for Russia, because it is an opportunity to close the Belarusian border just in case, so as not to create unnecessary obstacles for themselves with the possibility of leaving some people through Minsk to Uzbekistan or anywhere, and for Lukashenka. If these Russians end up on the territory of Belarus and then they will have to be returned to Russia, they will have to be caught, certain legal procedures will have to be carried out, perhaps for extradition or expulsion. These are extra troubles, it is easier to put cordons on the border and prevent these people from entering Belarus, then there will be no need to spend resources on their expulsion. I believe it has a technical nature, not a political one. Also, it may be of a political nature for Russia, but it is more of a technical measure for Lukashenka.

– The whole of Belarus is actively discussing Lukashenka's obvious health problems. What does this say about the Belarusian regime?

– That’s true, let's follow, this is a hot topic in Belarus today, but the discussion of Lukashenka's health has been going on for not a year, not two, maybe, even more than ten. What happened in the Kremlin attracted a lot of attention, but we are not at a turning point today. What are the likely political implications? In this regard, it’s important to understand that if the situation with Lukashenka’s health does not just continue to deteriorate, but becomes such an influential factor, that is, everyone will proceed from the fact that Lukashenka will leave the political stage sooner rather than later, a certain political process will begin in the country.

But since there are no real political groups claiming power inside Belarus after Lukashenka’s thirty years of rule, they are not structured, the struggle for Lukashenka’s legacy will not take place inside Minsk, and it will take place not between regional Belarusian groups, it will take place along the Moscow-Belarus line. It will be extremely important for the Kremlin to prevent any destabilization of the situation in the event Lukashenka leaves power, chaos, aggravation of the political struggle, and so on. Under these conditions, most likely, Moscow will play ahead of the curve, they may try to agree with Lukashenka on the successor. I do not rule out such an option, because it is easier if he agrees to voluntarily transfer the power to a person who will suit him to some extent. I say again, for this his health must seriously deteriorate compared to where we are today.

Or, if he does not agree, then relying on some other structures in Belarus, primarily power structures, appoint a person who no longer cares whether he will be acceptable to Lukashenka, it is important that he be acceptable to Moscow. The Belarusian ruling elites are quite weak-willed so they are posing risk, they are used to existing like this for more than a generation long. It is more convenient for them to have a master. Therefore, they can quite easily switch to a new boss, who will be appointed from Moscow.

Here we can draw a parallel with the change of loyalty of the administrative elites of the Crimea, when Russia came. That is, the absolute majority simply integrated into the new Russian power vertical, some more successfully, some less successfully. However, the bulk came under the new boss. This is a big risk for the future of Belarus, its sovereignty and its political existence as an independent state. It is necessary to take this risk into account, and the Belarusian opposition can only counter this by raising the issue as a preventive measure, starting a new political campaign within the country, explaining this risk and trying to work with those citizens, the remnants of civil society in Belarus, for whom this is unacceptable. This is a difficult task, which is different from what everyone is used to, from trips to Western capitals and drawing up some more or less successful documents. But this is not a hopeless task, you just need to realize in time that the political situation in the country is changing and you need to start working differently.

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