Olesya Yakhno: Putin's Capability Was Called Into Question

There are already nine pressure groups in the Kremlin.

Ukrainian political scientist and journalist Olesya Yakhno believes that the war in Ukraine could trigger a chain of unpredictable events within Russia.

She spoke about the unfairness of the mobilization process announced by Putin, the conflict among the Kremlin elites and the possibility of transforming Belarus in an interview with Charter97.org.

— What problems of the Russian Federation were revealed by Putin's mobilization?

— Mobilization, probably, was conceived by the Russian authorities as a factor of external aggression, there was a need to start explaining to Russian citizens that this was not a “special operation”, but a war. The “special operation” dragged on for more than six months.

But in the end, what was conceived as an external factor can have unpredictable internal consequences. As a result, mobilization begins to act like an ammonia spirit to a sleeping person. The Russians are now under the anesthetic of propaganda, under the anesthetic of this pact, which they managed to keep for quite a long time when Russian citizens exchanged any of their civic engagement for TV sets, propaganda and refrigerators, some kind of basic sets.

Due to the ammonia of mobilization, Russian citizens begin to wake up and generally realize something. They see that someone can start taking away their refrigerators and cutting their options.

The mobilization has already very clearly shown several injustices within Russia. First, a selective approach to those who are taken to the war. They started with national minorities. In fact, there have been many statements about this.

Secondly, social injustice was revealed: the difference between the upper layer and the lower layer, that is, between the elite and the far countrymen. I think there will not be many examples when the children of State Duma deputies, ministers and other high officials go to war. There will be very few such cases. We see that a lot of people are trying to evade mobilization when conscription notices are simply handed out on the street, or in offices. And this is also an indicator of its perception in some way.

And it's not that Russian citizens suddenly see the light and start thinking about Ukraine, how bad it is to fight with Ukraine. No, they are just against the war, because few people love war, you can die in a war. The Russians will see this injustice, and this will undermine the structure that the Russian authorities managed to build.

The competition between different power agencies and structures is intensifying. There is more and more information that Prigozhyn criticizes someone, or other figures criticize someone else. Now there are about nine different groups that influence this war. And when there are so many groups and even more participants are needed, the competition begins.

— If we delve into the topic of injustice within Russia, then why are Buryats, Tuvans, representatives of the peoples of the Caucasus and other subjects of the Russian Federation sent to the front in the first place, and not ethnic Russians?

— Initially, the Russian authorities simply did not want the so-called special operation to be perceived as a war, they tried to suppress the consequences at the all-Russian level in every possible way. Therefore, they concentrated on the provinces, that is, they took national minorities from the republics so that this would not be felt at the level of Moscow, St. Petersburg and other large cities. The authorities did not want the war to be felt at the all-Russian level. In addition, it was all motivated by money, the financial component. First of all, the indigent went to fight, who would not talk about it later.

We remember how the cruiser Moskva was sunk. Then, for a very long time, none of the families could understand whether their relatives died there or not. The Russian authorities did not report, they simply said "we cannot find them".

In the beginning, when the decision on the mobilization was made, we saw many people were trying to leave and actually left Russia for those countries where they were allowed to enter. So yes, such injustice was primarily aimed at hiding the fact that it was actually a war and suppressing unrest so that there was no internal panic. And at the second stage, it became clear that social injustice also works, that the elites can do everything, but the far countrymen, they are somewhere there, so far away.

— You mentioned the processes within the Russian elites. Analysts write that Prigozhyn and Kadyrov have started a struggle for power in Russia. They criticize the MOD, and "Putin's cook" even creates an additional military structure. What can conflicts in the Kremlin result in?

— I would not exaggerate the role of Prigozhyn, because he can still be a performer or be together with someone else, but an independent figure who can claim something in power, no. But, nevertheless, he can be on the side of one of the groups. Therefore, such criticism does not indicate that Prigozhyn is gaining strong influence, but Shoigu's positions, criticized by him, are weakening.

Neither Plan A, the blitzkrieg, nor Plan B produced any tangible results in the south and east. They will be looking for guilt as the war drags on and the number of defeats increases.

It is quite possible that as economic resources are reduced, competition will increase and they will simply get rid of everyone they can. Russian elites will shrink simply because there will be fewer resources. Since the beginning of the war, we have seen former and current top managers of large companies killed or committed suicide. These people had some information or some resources, so this is also such a marker that the fight is already being fought at such a level and will go to a higher one.

All this military rhetoric and the military course are aimed at suppressing the discussion of the domestic agenda. According to some forecasts, if Russia remains the same as it is now, then it will have a majority Muslim population by 2050. But at the same time, the Russian authorities are engaged in the so-called “Russian spring” in Ukraine.

There are two points: the external course and Russia's claims to imperialism. This sounded in one form or another under different presidents. Now the war can trigger internal unpredictability in Russia. Until some point, there was at least an outer appearance of elections. Now, there are no elections at all. Changes and "renovation" Putin's presidential terms also are looking meaningless, because the war has overshadowed everything. It is not clear what the internal structure will be and what is the Russian course.

The Kremlin launched this external process, but in the end, it will turn inward and it is not known how this will change Russia. Limitation within its territory is not the only option, it can even happen in terms of the system that exists. It is gone, there is no governed democracy, there is no sovereign democracy, and it is unclear what it is.

— If we are talking about external processes, then we can say that Russia is rapidly losing influence on the former satellites. What will happen to the post-Soviet world?

— This is due to the fact that few people love war, especially if the goals and objectives of this war are unclear. If this war has no prospects, then why be an accomplice and fall under sanctions, fall under isolation and quarrel from scratch with Ukraine or other countries. Few see this prospect as attractive.

Even starting from 2014, when the war was not as full-scale as it is now, there were already some contradictions within the EAEU even then. No one wanted to impose sanctions against Ukraine, everyone tried to evade Russian sanctions, because it is not very attractive. And even more so now, after the full-scale invasion.

We know that Russia reacted to Kazakhstan's statement about the non-recognition of the "LPR" and "DPR" by cutting off oil exports. As a result, Kazakhstan resorted to workarounds. The logic of this economic blackmail, the logic of the need to be drawn into a collective crime, is of little interest to anyone.

Several countries can be indicated today. There is Belarus with the Lukashenka regime tied to the Putin regime, having little space for maneuvers. The Belarusian dictator is dependent, but even he is trying to evade the entry of Belarusian troops into Ukraine.

There are also states that take advantage of Russia's mistakes. China, Turkey and partly India are among such countries. They either buy energy resources at a big discount, in particular oil. They have other economic opportunities and receive some kind of preferences and benefits. But, of course, no one wants to be involved in this war. What is the perspective?

We remember that at the SCO summit, India and China have already stated that the war has dragged on, it has been lasting for too long and this is bad. Given the metaphysical nature of this war, when there are constant threats to use biological, nuclear and chemical weapons, no one wants to bear collective responsibility later, to be an accomplice in a crime.

Moreover, even Putin's and the Kremlin's capabilities at the CSTO level are now in question. We see that Russia is not very effective in cases of CSTO border conflicts between some states. Armenia and Azerbaijan may come to the conclusion that they will reduce the role of mediators and still try to find the option of peace that would then not allow other countries to use it for their own purposes in case of renovation of the conflict.

Therefore, if the war does not have a foreseeable future prospect, then it will not be supported. This is not a point for other states to be united around. Surkov is wrong in his "The Loneliness of the Half-Breed" article, that war is an ordinary kind of international politics and that a state can be at war for a long time. It can be at war if at the same time it has the internal resources, values, vision and strength to do it without the rest of the world. And if it is dependent on any external technologies and has neither vision nor values, then, of course, no one will take part in it, everyone will look for other options.

— Does Belarus have a chance to leave the Russian sphere of influence when a large-scale reformatting of the post-Soviet world begins?

— Yes, of course, because Belarus does not have the same problems as Russia. Russia has bigger problems than the Putin regime. This is the virus of imperialism.

As for Belarus, taking into account my information, it seems to me that Belarusians do not have expansionist sentiments, a desire to seize other states, invade the territory of other countries and try to grab someone's part. Belarusians want to live in a civilized state, with opportunities and prospects.

Changes will begin in Belarus as soon as the regime changes, because at the country level there is a clear image and a look into the future, the desire to live well and not to encroach upon other states.

There have been many discussions about what can be considered a victory for Ukraine since the start of a full-scale invasion. Initially, there was an opinion that the victory would be the return of the territories that had been captured since February 24 of this year. Now the position has completely changed, at least within Ukraine. The West partially supports the thesis that the victory will be the return of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within the borders of 1991, that is, including Crimea.

In my opinion, the next step will be to consider the final reformatting of the post-Soviet world as a victory. This will be considered a victory, because this long period of changing geopolitical eras will end with it. Even if Ukraine wins back a significant part of its territories, but still Russia remains as it is (I'm not talking about territories now, I'm talking about internal vision), then there will still be a flashpoint and the war will still continue at different levels.

Actually, this post-Soviet world no longer exists. The question is how it will look and the self-sufficiency of certain states. There are many regional conflicts now: there is Georgia-Abkhazia-Ossetia, there is Moldova-Transnistria, there is Azerbaijan-Armenia-Karabakh, and all of Ukraine is at war. The complete end of the war will be the end of all these conflicts, finding an agreement between neighbours and democratization.

Belarus needs democratization. I repeat that the victory in this war will be transformation.

Perhaps someone accuses the Belarusians of passivity, but this is a separate and controversial issue. But we can argue because there are many examples of Belarusians fighting on the side of Ukraine, there are partisan movements. Belarusians do not want to fight, that's a fact. Changes will come rapidly after the change of the political regime in Belarus.

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