Kalinouski Regiment Is Real And Legitimate Representative of Belarusian People

With whom should the Ukrainian authorities negotiate?

Ukrainian diplomat, people's deputy from the ruling Servant of the People political party Bohdan Yaremenko believes that Kyiv should form its own strategy towards Belarus, relying on the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment fighting in Ukraine. The website Charter97.org published the full version of his author's article.

"I am praising Ukrainian diplomacy a lot and deservedly in recent times. The reason is that, in my opinion, the war forced Ukraine to rethink a number of strategic directions of foreign policy. And although the rethinking took longer than we would like, I share what was approved by President Zelensky - the principled and tactical approaches being implemented to develop relations with NATO and the EU, I fully support the attitude towards developing relations with the United States as one of the two main foreign policy partners (together with the EU), as well as the desire to achieve an allied level of relations. I also see no reason to change anything in relation to Russia.

But as it should be for every serious state, it is impossible to do without dark corners in foreign policy. Belarus is the territory of "increased swampiness" for Ukraine, where both strategic vision and pragmatism are lacking.

The importance of this state for Ukraine is determined by military-strategic considerations.

The preservation of the "Union State" of Russia and Belarus will force Ukraine to consider the Belarusian-Ukrainian border as a frontline, which in the context of real politics will double its (frontline) length for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Even in the face of a decrease in combat activity on the southeastern front, the organization of the state border with Belarus through the front line will divert too many resources - both military and material. Not for clear calculations, but for illustration: the width of the defence line of one mechanized or tank brigade is 10-20 km.

The territory of Belarus (while maintaining the regime of the Russian Gauleiter Lukashenka) poses a direct threat to the territory of several regions - Chernihiv, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytsky, Rivne, Volyn and Lviv. This is the territory through which passes the main logistics corridor connecting Ukraine with friendly and partner states in the West, which must be protected at any cost. There are two nuclear power plants on this axis.

My statement about organizing the border with Lukashenka's Belarus as a frontline means more than certain organizational and engineering measures or the deployment of a certain number of troops on a line of more than 1000 km. The very existence of an “allied” Belarus for Russia will require the concentration of significant defence and security resources in great depth along the long line of the Ukrainian-Belarusian border.

Also, Ukraine is deprived of the right to carelessness and short-sightedness in the analysis and its prospects for joining the EU and NATO. You need to have a realistic plan B. If not the EU and NATO, then what? It is our state that will be the basis of the defence potential for most potential natural regional alliances with the participation of Ukraine. This means that all considerations regarding the future of Belarus will remain relevant. Almost all configurations of theoretically possible future regional alliances for Ukraine will include Poland and Lithuania, which have a number of their own problems with Belarus and consider its occupation by Russia a direct threat. Therefore they will count on Ukraine.

The continued existence of threats to Ukraine from the south (temporarily occupied Crimea and Sevastopol, the giant military base created by Russia), the southwest (Transnistria) and the north (authoritarian Belarus allied with Russia), in addition to the constant threat from Russia, will require Ukraine to significantly greater spending on defence and security than development needs allow. Therefore, these threats must be eliminated or minimized in an accessible and acceptable way, in some acceptable time frame, in some logical and understandable sequence.

I repeat, in addition to all the obvious threats associated with the de facto occupation of Belarus by Russia, a separate threat is the existence in Belarus of an illegitimate authoritarian puppet regime headed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka. Democratic state cannot be an ally of Russia or support its militaristic geopolitical ambitions.

For a very long time and too persistently, the idea was imposed on us that the soap bubble of the subsidized economy of Belarus, unable to exist independently of Russia, is a kind of social justice miracle. We were also satisfied with the fact that the cost of the existence of Lukashenka's economic model was energy resources from Russia, obtained at non-market political prices due to the dismantling of the Belarusian statehood and sovereignty and the emasculation of the national identity of the Belarusian people. In economic terms, the subsidization of the Belarusian economy created non-market and unfair advantages for the Belarusian economy over Ukrainian producers.

The problems of national identity in Belarus refer to the existential nature since the aggressive imposition of Russian rhetoric and discourses in domestic politics in Belarus will sooner or later make any transformation impossible. We will not be able to solve these and other problems with a non-democratic and unpredictable neighbouring state.

We have to state with regret that the Ukrainian policy towards Belarus has no signs of the existence of a strategy aimed at eliminating the threats described above, and the policy of Ukraine aimed at reducing actual threats from Belarus is neither consistent nor sufficient: on the one hand, we are already conducting serious, large-scale and very expensive defensive preparations, and on the other hand, we allow Lukashenka to pretend to be a fool, making promises that he cannot keep (for example, not to attack Ukraine).

This situation is not new, but rather a painful legacy.

For a very long time, Ukrainian policy towards Belarus was not of a fundamental or valuable character, it was determined by corrupt politicians and mercantile interests of people close to power for a quick profit. Until recently, Lukashenka's apologists created the mainstream in the information field: we heard admiration for the "firm hand" and "strong business executive", "the cunning policy of balancing Belarus between Russia and the West", that "not everything is so simple in Belarus" and without Lukashenka's permission Belarusians " would not help us to pull a couple of dozen blades for combat helicopters from Russia”, “Lukashenka does not support the annexation of Crimea”, and “it is impossible to stop buying electricity from Belarus, because the energy balance will be disturbed”, “refusal to supply gasoline and diesel will be a collapse for us and will finally make Belarus dependent on subsidies from Russia”, and “the recognition of Lukashenka as illegitimate will leave him no choice but to be an ally of Russia”.

All these fables about Belarus and Lukashenka are frankly cynical and undisguised custom-made lies of a propagandistic and special service nature. Lukashenka is only interested in the survival of his political regime. At any cost. The cost of defending Kyiv in March 2022 and our unpreparedness for an attack from Belarus, which Ukrainian officials for some reason call the “treason” of the Belarusian elite (which just was and remained loyal and devoted to its Kremlin masters and under no circumstances could do otherwise ), should finalize all discussions about the benefits of cooperation with Lukashenka.

If we believe that the bearers and distributors of this lie were sincerely mistaken (and their mistake cost us all the tragedies and victims of the Kyiv and Chernihiv defence), then why are we so uncertainly deprived of the approaches imposed by them? What do we continue to take care of in relations with Belarus? Why, having taken one correct step, the creation of the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment, citizens and immigrants from Belarus are invited to serve there and defend Ukraine from Russia together with us, we do not do other obvious things, such as: breaking diplomatic relations with Lukashenka’s state and moving towards the restoration of the statehood of the Belarusian people, strengthening sanctions against the Belarusian regime and international coordination of the relevant policy towards Belarus.

How can one think after February 24 that the unprincipled and insufficient reaction of Ukraine to both the invasion from Belarus and the daily bombing of Ukraine will deter Lukashenka from something? We see that Lukashenka and the people close to him have long been accustomed to killing Ukrainians together with the Russians, even if they once experienced inconvenience from the obvious inconsistency of their statements and actions on Ukraine. At the same time sending us diplomatic notes about some fictitious attacks "from all the axes".

It is clear that it is not in Ukraine's interests to open a second front. But it has already existed since February 2022! We need both people and valuable ammunition for grinding a couple of brigades that can invade again from the territory of Belarus by land, in other places. But anyone who is convinced that Lukashenka's decision whether or not to send his troops to Ukraine depends on our political curtsy or manoeuvring, and not on the will of the Kremlin, is either an unreasonable or dishonest person.

From the point of view of political and military analysis and planning, another invasion from the territory of Belarus should be considered a settled issue. It is because Putin is not going to end the war and continues to look for ways to escalate it. Russian troops have already practised an invasion from Belarus, have done work on the mistakes and are constantly strengthening the material and technical base of their contingent in Belarus, and are also mobilizing to increase their armed forces. If Putin makes the appropriate decision, who will stop him from repeating in a slightly different way what he already did once in February of this year? Will it be Lukashenka? Why couldn't he or didn't want to do it last time? What changed?

Lukashenka may perceive the lack of active and aggressive reaction from Ukraine to the attack only as evidence that he still has time and opportunities for his own political games (since Kyiv does not aggravate, then there is still an opportunity to put pressure on him, playing along with the Russian master).

There is no reason to reject the opinion that a combination of breaking off diplomatic relations, other political and diplomatic actions and preventive measures, combined with a well-planned massive strike against concentrations and bases of Russian troops in Belarus, from which Ukraine was shelled, would be much more beneficial measure to deter Lukashenka (moreover, justified in terms of international law and the rules of war) than our constant flirting and behind-the-scenes bargaining with a self-proclaimed dictator who has long moved from killing his citizens to killing ours.

What is a more effective response to the daily launches of Iranian kamikaze drones from the territory of Belarus, killing Ukrainians and destroying infrastructure? Diplomatic note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine or a retaliatory strike?

Relying on one's own forces in strengthening opposition to Lukashenka looks to me much more reasonable than the hope that he will be able or willing to resist Putin's pressure. Trying to get him to do what is good for us is more realistic than expecting him not to do something good for Russia. Our actions should give Lukashenka an incentive to change his approach, abandon his desire to constantly provoke us and focus more on efforts to further oppose Russia. The pressure from Ukraine should outweigh the Russian one since Lukashenka is afraid of force. Since Lukashenka is only worried about the fate of his regime, then we must create a threat to the existence of this regime no less realistic than the Russians.

Just in case, I will once again emphasize the obvious thing: Lukashenka's only motive is to maintain his rule. Therefore, the only possible positive scenario for influencing him is to offer more than Russia. But even this will not guarantee success, since Russia's control over Belarus, including people close to Lukashenka, should be considered complete. Therefore, I would not hope for any chance of outplaying Russia in the field of "handouts and bribery".

Last year, Ukraine made a fundamental decision not to recognize the results of the presidential elections in Belarus and to call Lukashenka an illegitimate leader. Ukraine quite gradually adheres to the declared line, refusing (at least officially and publicly) a political dialogue with the Belarusian usurper himself and all central authorities.

But the Belarusian state and especially the Belarusian people did not stop existing because of this! Who can become a representative of Belarus for negotiations in the absence of legitimate power? I think that postponing the search for answers to these questions will only mean depriving yourself of influence not only on the current situation in Belarus but also on your future.

This isn't a trivial problem (which, by the way, also arises with Russia, due to the decision to refuse interaction with Putin) that does not have a simple solution. Some hidden contacts through informal intermediaries must exist at a high political level. We should not completely abandon "technical" official contacts. Contacts with representatives of local authorities, interpersonal contacts, etc. are possible taking into account the realities of a tough counter-intelligence regime and the subordination of Belarusian special services to Russian ones.

Assuming that the Belarusian authorities cannot exercise political representation of the people of this country, then the only obvious alternative is the opposition.

However, here too there are difficulties. The Belarusian opposition exists only in Belarussian prisons, while abroad it experiences all the typical difficulties and problems of emigration, including division across different countries and political fragmentation. The so-called old opposition, far from being the only representatives of which are Zianon Pazniak, Andrei Sannikov, Natallia Radzina, Dzmitry Bandarenka and many other ardent Lukashenka's opponents, who, after imprisonment, torture, intimidation or political provocations, were driven out of Belarus many years ago. These are predominantly intellectual and ideological people, well-known in Ukraine and who have earned fairly wide recognition in the Western world because of their adherence to the professed principles, democratic and humanistic ideals. However, their long and forced absence from Belarus makes them less visible and influential in the real political environment.

The mass political emigrants from Belarus, triggered by last year's violent suppression of protests, are mixed. A certain number of social activists and less politically ambitious protesters have found shelter in Ukraine. It should be recognized that Ukraine even held back migration from Belarus, including because of the position of the special services, which promptly identified Lukashenka's attempts to use the flow of political refugees abroad to infiltrate his agents.

IUkraine was encouraging only representatives of the IT sector to leave Belarus, but they were not very often politically affiliated. The policy in relation to other groups of Belarusians was not clear at all. Therefore, during the year, the Belarusian community of Ukraine did not initiate its own noticeable political projects.

The central oppositional personality in the presidential election, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaia, and her numerous entourage, who settled in Lithuania, have a very ambiguous reputation. During the political presidential campaign and after it, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaia made so many mistakes that her stable political views and leadership qualities appeared in doubt. There are completely random people near her, as well as people in relation to whom the above-described concerns of Ukrainian and not other special services may arise.

So far, it is difficult for me to propose an approach other than that taken by the Ukrainian authorities: to avoid contact and closely monitor this political group, as well as its efforts to achieve wide international recognition, which, nevertheless, gives the impression of political tourism.

According to available information, the Lithuanian authorities also experience some discomfort from the presence of this political group on their territory. They have to bear the corresponding political, organizational and financial costs, not having a full understanding of what to do with it, as well as the certainty of what all this will lead to.

People in Belarus also have an ambiguous attitude towards Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaia in Belarus. Belarusians, putting marks next to her last name, voted against Lukashenka rather than for her because of her sudden appearance in the presidential race. Belarusians, putting marks next to her last name, voted against Lukashenka rather than for her because of her sudden appearance in the presidential race.

The above-mentioned Kastus Kalinouski Regiment can certainly be considered the most reputable institution among Belarusians, both inside the country and outside it. Belarusian soldiers have earned their authority in the hard way of real battles, where they worthily represented both the chevrons of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the White-Red-White flag banned by Lukashenka. Supporters of Lukashenka and Belarusian minions of Russia treat the regiment with understandable hatred, but they can no longer ignore its existence. They only spread information about its existence with their reactions. People who oppose Lukashenka consider the regiment to be almost the only hope for the upcoming changes in Belarus, since they are convinced that the repressive Russian-Belarusian regime has destroyed all opportunities to gain political will for transformations inside the country.

Progressive and democratic Belarusians treat the regiment in much the same way as Ukrainians treat the Armed Forces of Ukraine: they volunteer for the regiment and support their and our fighters to the best of their ability. One can sometimes hear very unfair criticism of the regiment in Ukraine, people say that several hundred fighters are too few to draw conclusions about the Belarusians and their role in the Russian war against Ukraine. It should be remembered that Belarus has in fact introduce the regime of exit visas for its citizens, there is no direct communication with Ukraine, and Ukraine's ability to filter, check, train and maintain Belarusian volunteers is also quite limited.

It is clear that the soldiers of the regiment cannot engage in politics. But there are quite politically mature and active citizens of Belarus among the Belarusian patriots of the Kalinouski Regiment, and they are quite capable and interested in political activity. The Kalinovites have already thought about the fact that they have no right to limit their tasks only to participation in the war against Russia, and given their authority, they must bear responsibility for the fate of the Belarusian opposition and for the future of internal transformations in Belarus. Recently, the regiment elected its political representation, the Soim, which included both the regiment's fighters and representatives of the new wave of Belarusian emigration.

This structure, in case of recognition of its existence by Ukraine, is quite capable of becoming a platform for a broad unification of the Belarusian opposition located in Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania.

If such a broad opposition platform for Belarus is created, then the next logical step would be to recognize it as one of the legitimate representatives of the interests of the Belarusian people. It can be expected that the combined efforts of Ukraine, Lithuania and Poland will make it possible to find official forms of interaction with such an opposition platform (even right up to recognizing the right of the executive institution of the united opposition to provide consular and notarial services for the benefit of Belarusian citizens who are forced to live abroad, etc.), which will inspire Belarusian resistance and deprive Lukashenka of his legitimacy in the eyes of the Belarusian people.

The military side of the regiment will continue to exist and may have interesting perspectives. For example, Lithuania and Poland could also create Belarusian national military units, as part of a tripartite agreement with Ukraine, of the platoon, company or battalion level (depending on the number of people who want to serve in them) within their armed forces and make these units the personnel basis for the Ukrainian- Polish-Lithuanian brigade. Belarusian soldiers, who do not confuse the oath to the people and Lukashenka, could also pass military service in these units. Quite quickly, such a brigade can become a power factor that the Belarusian authorities will have to reckon with when planning any illegal punitive or repressive actions against their people. Such a project would be a serious application for the influence and development of events in the region for our three states, as well as proof of the viability of new regional associations.

However, to implement such ambitious projects, Ukraine first needs to put its legal framework in order, by analogy with the recent decisions of the President of Ukraine to refuse cooperation with Putin or the decision of the parliament to recognize the right of the peoples of Russia to self-determination. Breaking diplomatic relations with Belarus should not be the last political step, but the first one on the way to the official and publicly declared goal: the liberation of Belarus from Russian occupation and internal usurpation.

The Belarusian issue can become one of the main for the development of inter-parliamentary diplomacy. In particular, focusing the attention of the parliamentarians of Ukraine, Lithuania and Poland on the problems of Belarus can reveal the potential of the trilateral inter-parliamentary assembly of our countries in a new way. The significance of the problems associated with Belarus for the future of our region is so great that cooperation on their solution is quite capable of turning this semi-formal inter-parliamentary structure into a promising regional organization like the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, which will become for Ukraine both a logical continuation of its regional policy from south to north, and a fresh impetus for rethinking the idea of the Baltic-Black Sea area, as well as the development of the Lublin Triangle project.

This new East European political association will advocate and protect future Belarus while its returning to the political family of European peoples and a source of additional resources for solving internal issues.

Therefore, there is no time to waste. Ukraine has a field of possibilities to defend itself and help restore the freedom of the fraternal people, whose representatives, in the same order of battle with the Ukrainians, defend Ukrainian freedom. At the same time, we do not need and will not need to fight for the Belarusians, we only need to help them to organize themselves. They can do all the rest on their own.

This is the author's version, the edited and shortened version was first published on the European Pravda website

If you like this article, you can support the website Charter97.org

MULTI-CURRENCY ACCOUNT FOR ASSISTANCE:

Bank's name: Bank Millennium S.A.
Address: ul. Stanislawa Zaryna, 2A, 02-593, Warszawa
IBAN: PL 97 1160 2202 0000 0002 1671 1123
SWIFT: BIGBPLPW
Name of the account holder: Fundacja “KARTA ‘97”
Purpose/title of payment: Donation for statuary aims

You can contact us by the e-mail [email protected]